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**FORSAKEN CRIES:
THE STORY OF RWANDA
AND EDUCATING FOR ACTION**

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AND

EDUCATING FOR ACTION

In 1994, close to one million people were killed in a planned and systematic genocide in the Central African country of Rwanda. How did this carnage occur when the world declared after World War II that it would “never again” tolerate such violence? Who was responsible? Why did the international community fail to respond? How can we prevent the spiraling communal conflicts of the global era? *Forsaken Cries* is a new video documentary, produced by Amnesty International USA, to help answer these questions. In the process, it examines Rwanda as a case study of the human rights challenges of the 21st Century.

The video is designed for use by activists, academics, policy makers, and educators. Its purpose is to explore the history of the crisis and generate debate on the strategies that could have been pursued to prevent the genocide. It is also a tool for analyzing what can be effective in the future as the international community confronts similar conditions.

Educating for Action is a set of informational materials and primary documents on key themes from the video. Taken together, the sections provide a comprehensive look at the genocide in Rwanda, with recommendations for action in the future. Or, each section of materials can be tailored to a targeted audience for a focused discussion on one aspect of the human rights challenges of the future and strategies for response. Whether focusing upon issues of rape as a weapon of war, refugee rights, accountability and justice, or arms transfers, the sections examine the larger international context for the issue, the specific application to the Rwandan case, and implications for the future. Each section ends with a set of questions for discussion.

Use the video and educational materials for:

- ◆ **Outreach:** Events can be scheduled with social justice groups, religious congregations, women's organizations, and others concerned with human rights to raise awareness about Rwanda and specific categories of human rights violations. To prevent such violence from occurring again, it must be demonstrated to the leaders of the international community that a constituency for human rights exists.

- ◆ **Activist education and training:** Combined with the video, these materials provide the basis for a focused discussion of activist strategies. How effective are our strategies? How can human rights activists improve their response to prevent genocide in the future? How do we mobilize the international community in the face of spiraling communal conflicts in an era of weak commitment to humanitarianism and multilateralism? By addressing these questions, human rights groups and individuals can debate their own efforts and sharpen their capacities to act in the future.
- ◆ **Classroom application:** The last section of this manual provides a set of week-long activities for teachers to use in their classrooms. Designed by Amnesty International's Human Rights Educators' Network for high school and undergraduate college students, these activities prepare students for viewing the video and translating its themes into the current international context. Employing innovative participatory exercises, the materials can also be adapted for adult education.

The Board of Directors of Amnesty International USA decided to make the documentary as a tool to provoke debate about the lessons learned from the crisis and to stimulate discussion about new strategies for prevention. It hired Kathi Austin of the Africa Project at the Institute of Policy Studies and Andrea Torrice, an independent filmmaker, to design and produce the video. Many thanks to Kathi and Andrea for all of their hard work and dedication. Amnesty International USA would also like to thank all contributors to the video project, credited in the film.

The Board also authorized the production of these materials as a joint project between the National Field Program and the Human Rights Educators' Steering Committee. Additional thanks to the following people, who contributed so generously to the development of the information and training materials, *Educating for Action*. Many anonymously wrote sections of the materials or provided their expertise on relevant subject matter. Most especially:

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Amnesty International USA



FIGHT GENOCIDE--STOP IMPUNITY!

Almost one million Rwandans were killed between April and June, 1994, in what is now known as the fastest genocide in recorded history. Children, women, the elderly and men were butchered because of their ethnic origin or their resistance to the policies of the extremist Hutu government in Rwanda. They were also killed because of impunity.

On November 8, 1995, the UN Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and gave it the task of prosecuting those responsible for genocide and other war crimes that took place during 1994 in Rwanda. The Tribunal is headed today by Judge Louise Arbour of Canada, and is located in Arusha, Tanzania. By early 1997, it had indicted twenty-one persons. It is struggling to overcome poor management, inadequate funding, and weak political support from various countries.

The Rwanda War Crimes Tribunal represents the best and possibly last opportunity for the international community to help end impunity, bring justice to the survivors of the genocide, and restore respect for human rights in Rwanda. It is essential that the Tribunal be reformed, revitalized, and given all necessary support so that it functions properly and meets its mandate.

ACTION:

Mobilize your community and show the Clinton administration and Congress that you care about justice in Central Africa and the work of the Rwanda Tribunal:

- ♦ Hold public screenings of the film, *Forsaken Cries: The Story of Rwanda* in coalition with other groups, organizations, and institutions;
- ♦ Write articles or letters about the Tribunal, its importance to peace and stability in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, and its importance to you and your community. Send the letters to your local newspapers;
- ♦ Urge the U.S. Government to provide the necessary funding, managerial support and political backing for the Tribunal, especially for the Victim and Witness Unit, so that it can protect witnesses and survivors of the genocide. Write your Congressional Representative and the Secretary of State, Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. Department of State, 2201 C Street, NW, Washington, DC 20520;
- ♦ Publicize the need for the issues of rape and other forms of sexual violence to be aggressively prosecuted as a war crime by the Tribunal, and that all Tribunal staff be trained to this end;
- ♦ Call for the strengthening of mechanisms within the Tribunal to improve the prosecution of gender-based crimes, including the appointment of qualified personnel, especially women, with the skills to interview survivors of sexual abuse. Also call for the Sexual Assault Committee created by the Deputy Prosecutor to be linked to the Sexual Assault Unit based in the Hague, Netherlands. Write to Judge Louise Arbour, Chief Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Churchill Plein #1, The Hague, Netherlands.



THE NEW HUMAN RIGHTS CHALLENGES: STRATEGIES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

At the cusp of a new century, the world faces a crossroads in the advancement of human rights. Profound challenges lie ahead, with the eroding authority of governments, the shift in power to economic actors, and the explosion of nationalist identities. Intensified suffering and mass dislocations are increasingly the breeding ground for human rights violations. How do we reconcile the great advances in the promotion of human rights over the last century with the massive human rights violations in the former Yugoslavia, Africa's Great Lakes region, the newly emerging states of the former Soviet Union, and many other parts of the world today? How do we respond to the communal conflicts of the contemporary period?

Communal conflicts are characterized by organized systems of political oppressions in which persons are subjected to systematic violence orchestrated by the state, or, increasingly, by quasi-state political organizations on the basis of group identities. Historically, political leaders have manipulated ethnic or religious identities to control demands and retain their power, when lacking universal legitimacy. With the erosion of the Cold War "superpower" support and in the face of economic downturns, the impulse towards manipulation on communal grounds has only increased. This has set in motion the patterns of discrimination and humiliation that are the seed of social explosion. Any number of political, economic, or social changes can prove catalytic and the spiral to genocide is unleashed.

New strategies must be developed to uphold the universal standards of human rights and prevent the cycles of mass killings and genocide. New strategies demand a clear understanding of the challenges, strong action by governments and international institutions alike, and an educated and committed community of people that refuse to tolerate inadequate responses or the argument that nothing can be done. We must tailor our strategies to develop effective early warning systems, the capacity to respond quickly to exploding crises, and to demand accountability and justice to ensure that a culture of human rights is developed for the future.

The Birth of the Human Rights Movement

At the end of the Second World War, the international community responded to the unprecedented levels of human carnage with conviction and amazing consensus. A revolutionary framework was put into place that constrained the authority of states, while at the same time recognizing the inherent rights and dignity of all people, irrespective of political affiliation or national identity. With the signing of the **Universal Declaration of Human Rights** on December 10, 1948, a commitment was made that all governments had a responsibility to uphold these new principles and ensure their effective implementation. And upon the signing of the Genocide Convention, it was hoped that the world would never again witness the genocidal conditions of World War II. A system of intricate laws and institutions to codify, interpret, and enforce these commitments evolved. But the exhilaration of these successes was quickly eclipsed by the Cold War.

The U.S. and the USSR began to engage in proxy battles, typically manipulating civil strife fostered by national liberation aspirations of former colonies and various ethnic and religious groups. The basic human rights of people throughout the Southern world were quickly subsumed under the dictates of the Cold War and the perceived security threat. Faced with a dramatic growth of world-wide liberation movements and an intensified level of Soviet support, human rights concerns were either buried or selectively interpreted to defend the primacy of military considerations.

In the aftermath of World War I and World War II, professional international diplomats had gradually worked to build the infrastructure for human rights. They worked closely with legal experts and academics, and a core group of human rights activists. But the human rights system would only come alive when sparked by the growing grass-roots human rights movement. This movement infused the laws and structures with real meaning and real political power.

In many ways, Vietnam marked the birth of the international human rights movement. While other movements for peace and justice existed in Western countries during the Cold War, their reach was slim. But as the human costs of decolonization escalated and the proxy battles raged, political and religious institutions were able to capture a moral high ground to challenge state security concerns, mobilizing broader and broader constituencies in their opposition. The growth in the Southern world peoples' movements, coupled with the explosion in resistance politics in the countries of the West, produced a political space for emerging transnational connections between movements for social change. Vietnam symbolized the convergence of Southern world resistance to the Cold War with Western citizen activism for peace and human rights.

The earliest human rights organizations began to channel popular concern for human rights, peace, and social justice into policy recommendations and grass roots activism. The combined actions of the growing membership of Amnesty International and religious institutions further amplified the human rights message in public discourse and the mainstream media. These partnerships between human rights organizations, grass-roots activists, and international legal advisors and diplomats brought to fruition an explosion of activity, manifested in the waning years of the Cold War.

In the late 1980's and early 1990's, the collapse of the Berlin Wall was greeted with euphoria. The human rights ideal was a guiding force for democracy throughout the 1980's in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and, most notably, Eastern Europe. Many thought the triumph of human rights and democracy foreshadowed a "new world order" characterized by the strengthening of the universality of human rights, the development of new laws and institutions to hold governments accountable for their past violations, and a greater commitment to universality and multilateralism through the United Nations. People around the world were demanding to have a voice and greater freedoms and the world seemed ready to respond.

The New Human Rights Challenges: Communal Conflict

Yet, the world was quickly confronted with new challenges and complexities that demanded a rethinking of the sources of violence and the most effective strategies to respond. In a few short years, we witnessed a scale of violence that few thought the world could tolerate again. The speed and scale of this violence was unprecedented and included the dislocations of whole populations of people, and the fragmentation of societies from governments. The methods of response seemed outdated and ineffective.

Earlier in the century the United Nations was created in order to thwart cross-border aggression, preserve international peace, and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms. However, in so doing it failed to resolve the question of what responsibilities member states have regarding armed conflicts, civil wars, systematic human rights violations, mass killings, genocide and politicides that take place within the

borders of sovereign states. Our international institutions are fully unable to respond to genocidal conditions once unleashed and the international community of powerful states is unwilling to respond once the costs of intervention are too high. Without the capacity or the will to respond, it cannot be left to the United Nations to develop effective solutions. Therefore, it is imperative that human rights advocates read the early warning signs of exploding violence, shift to preventive strategies, and avert genocidal conditions.

Early Warning

It is clear that once genocidal attacks have been unleashed, it is virtually impossible to mediate, stop or transform them. In the face of the risks, the international community will predictably falter, falling victim to indecision and inefficiency. How do we build an effective preventive strategy? We must develop an early warning system that allows us to mobilize international pressure when the first patterns of violence and mass scale discrimination appear.

The human rights methods of the past, that respond to violence against individual activists, are not irrelevant to today's abuses. If we respond quickly enough, with sufficient strength and clarity, we are the sounding cries for impending crises. In the film, *Forsaken Cries*, Gerald Gahima, the Rwandan Minister of Justice, argued that "What was needed was a message from the international community that what was happening was unacceptable, would not be tolerated. If that had happened, the killings would have stopped."

In addition to responding quickly and with powerful pressure to violations against individual human rights defenders, we need to be able to respond to emerging patterns of group violence and hold those accountable for inflaming tensions and sparking violence. Governments are often directly responsible for sparking communal conflict or indirectly responsible for utilizing group identities as a means of wielding political control or political legitimacy. Therefore, the goal is to establish standards of state behavior and determine the degree of accountability a state has for either reinforcing intolerance, harassing communities, discriminating against them, or directly unleashing violence.

Government discrimination can marginalize communities and create a climate of suspicion and intolerance. They can set up expectations and entitlement based upon identity. In turn, they can create conditions of tension between groups that will warrant government intervention or produce private violence which governments fail to control as part of a plan to eliminate threats to their power.

Governments can covertly support 'private forces' and therefore not be held directly accountable for inciting tensions, by:

- ◆ arming militias;
- ◆ inciting hatred, often through the use of media and demagogic language, and;
- ◆ defining rights by communities and not for individuals.

Given the changing nature of these abuses and the shifting accountability between states and armed militias, the international community must address the human rights violations by:

- ◆ promoting education about the cycles of human rights violations in communal conflicts, focusing on the urgent need for preventive action;
- ◆ building the capacities of civil society where the patterns of mass violence have emerged;
- ◆ developing a system for identifying countries at risk, including monitoring media, tracking discriminatory practices against groups, and evaluating shifting patterns in political power;
- ◆ deploying human rights monitors in the field to document the trends in abuse;
- ◆ calling for monitoring of end use of arms transfers to regions where conflict is spiraling towards mass human rights abuse and genocide, and;
- ◆ taking action to mobilize a response in concerned communities.

Crises Response: Evoking the Genocide Convention

If the early warning signs are not heeded, then the international community will be confronted with new and worsening cases of genocide. Escalating bloodshed shifts the world into a crisis response mode, but the options are usually limited at this stage. Once the downward spiral has begun and the human rights monitors and international non-governmental organizations are no longer able to operate, the only viable strategy is often military intervention. The United Nations has limited capacity and a constrained mandate to shift from peacekeeping to peacemaking, and the experience during the Somalia operation created a climate hostile for nations to commit military forces. If the crisis response stage is reached, our primary responsibility is to compel the powers of the international system to uphold their commitments under international law to respond to genocide (see essays entitled "What is Genocide" and "The World Fails to Respond").

Accountability and Justice: Building a Culture of Human Rights

In the aftermath of a genocide, attention is diverted to the area of the world where new violence is occurring. It is essential that the international community stay mobilized and remain vigilant in pursuing justice once the violence ends. A human rights culture requires justice for the victims and education for the future to ensure that the cycle of violence is broken.

The international community needs to have a judicial system capable of meting out justice to those individuals who have orchestrated or committed war crimes and crimes against humanity. Following the Second World War, the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal was created for this purpose, and now in the wake of Bosnia and Rwanda, the international community has created two ad hoc tribunals to indict and try persons accused of such crimes. It is now time for the international community to establish a permanent international criminal tribunal which has universal jurisdiction over such matters. Until such a system of international justice is created, some individuals will continue to get away with mass murder, and others will be encouraged to follow their example. Nor is true reconciliation possible until the victims of human rights violations believe that justice has been served and the perpetrators of such crimes have been identified and punished.

But none of these changes in the international system will occur unless there is the political will on the part of governments to hold themselves accountable for fulfilling their international obligations. Nations are jealous of their sovereignty and cannot be easily convinced to yield portions of it in order to gain greater international security and justice. If such changes will ever take place, it will be because a popular movement shames the governments of the world into doing so.

As we enter the 21st century, grass-roots activists, concerned citizens, and human rights organizations must summon our collective political will to end genocide and to fulfill the promise, "never again!" We are the early warning, we will compel governments to assume their responsibilities to avert genocide, and we must demand accountability and call for justice to forge a human rights culture!

Discussion Questions

1. Why is a focus upon new strategies for prevention so important?
2. How do the methods of the international human rights movement fit the need for effective early warning? How can additional methods be developed to raise the early warning call?
3. Discuss how the international human rights movement contributes to building a culture of human rights in the aftermath of genocide and massive human rights abuse.

UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Adopted and proclaimed by United Nations General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) on 10 December, 1948.

PREAMBLE

Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,

Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people,

Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law,

Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in cooperation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms,

Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance for the full realisation of this pledge,

Now, therefore, The General Assembly

Proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.

Article 1

All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

Article 2

Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.

Article 3

Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

Article 4

No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.

Article 5

No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Article 6

Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.

Article 7

All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection under the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.

Article 8

Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.

Article 9

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.

Article 10

Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.

Article 11

1. Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.
2. No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission, which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed.

Article 12

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

Article 13

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of the States.
2. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.

Article 14

1. Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.
2. This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 15

1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.

Article 16

1. Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage, and at its dissolution.
2. Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.
3. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.

Article 17

1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.

Article 18

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

Article 19

Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

Article 20

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.
2. No one may be compelled to belong to an association.

Article 21

1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
2. Everyone has the right to equal access to public service in his country.
3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

Article 22

Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international cooperation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.

Article 23

1. Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.
2. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.
3. Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself

and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.

4. Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.

Article 24

Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay.

Article 25

1. Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.

2. Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.

Article 26

1. Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.

2. Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.

3. Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.

Article 27

1. Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.

2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.

Article 28

Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.

Article 29

1. Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.

2. In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.

3. These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 30

Nothing in the Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.



HISTORY OF RWANDA

Introduction

Between April and June, 1994, an estimated 800,000 to one million people were killed in Rwanda. After the Holocaust, after the Nuremberg Trials, and after the creation of the United Nations and the United Nations Convention on Genocide, designed to prevent genocide from ever occurring again, the question needs to be asked, "How did this come about?" This historical overview gives background information about Rwanda and the people of that country in an attempt to shed light on this question.

The easy and superficial answer is that Africans are driven by irrational "tribal hatreds," and are condemned to periodic bouts of mutual self-slaughter. The reality is that the politics of war, conquest and killing is not unique to Africa—but it is the European view of Africa, shaped during colonial times, that Africans are intrinsically inferior and savage, and are hopelessly "tribalistic." While these very real ethnic divisions have historically existed in Rwanda, political leaders manipulated the divisions, culminating in the most rapid genocide of the modern era. "Tribalism" was used as an excuse by the international community to justify a lack of response and early intervention.

Social and Cultural Features of the Rwandan Population

The tiny nations of Rwanda and Burundi are nestled between the larger African nations of Zaire, Uganda, and Tanzania (see Map 1). In the case of Rwanda, as well as Burundi, the principal components of the population have included Tutsi (roughly 14%), Hutu (roughly 85%), and Twa (roughly 1%). The Tutsi emerged from the shadows of time as a dominant caste. Although their origins are uncertain, they have lived in the region of the Great Lakes of Africa for so many centuries it is impossible to distinguish their culture from that of the Hutu. To this day, they share the same language (Kinyarwanda), religion, customs, and beliefs. However, they did not share the power and wealth: a Tutsi was understood to be someone who owned enough cattle (typically at least ten), to be considered a person of stature in the community, and therefore who enjoyed the prerogative of rule. The principal social division was caste, with the Tutsi enjoying ownership of the cattle and control over much of the land, while the Hutu were primarily farmers, subject to Tutsi overlords. Both Tutsi and Hutu belonged to the same clans—indicating how strong the basic social ties between them were.

In some regions of Rwanda, Tutsi rulership coalesced into a kingdom, whereas other regions remained more independent. Tutsi who fell into poverty lost their Tutsi status, and became Hutu, whereas Hutu could rise to the status and position of Tutsi if they acquired enough wealth. By the time the Germans came as the first colonial conquerors, the social structures of present day Rwanda and Burundi were highly organized and pyramidal in nature, with a King at the pinnacle, and chiefs responsible for highly specialized functions underneath the King. The hierarchical and organized society of Rwanda laid a foundation upon which the subsequent genocide of 1994 was constructed.

Colonial Rule

The German colonial rule (roughly 1890 to 1917) was brief, as they were replaced by the Belgians after World War I, and it was the Belgians who ruled over Rwanda, Burundi and the Belgian Congo (present day Zaire). Like most colonialists, the Belgians needed collaborators among the African population in order to rule over their vast colonies, and in Rwanda and Burundi, these collaborators—those who ruled as subalterns under the Belgians—were the Tutsi. Perhaps the Belgians took the Tutsi appearance—taller and thinner than the Hutu, with aquiline facial features—as a sign of their racial superiority. In any event, the authority of the Tutsi, previously conditioned by clan allegiances and limited in scope, expanded dramatically, and with it their control over the most limited resource in Rwanda—land. Simultaneously, Tutsi rulers, including the king, extended labor and tax obligations on the Hutu population far beyond what had earlier been customary. And to complete the pattern of oppression, the Belgians now required Tutsi and Hutu to carry **identity cards** with their ethnic identity—an identity that was now immutable. Under the Belgian rule, the Hutu resentment against the Tutsi germinated and took root in Rwandan society.

Belgian rule came to an end in 1962. Three years before the Belgians departed, their policy makers, swayed by missionary sympathies for their Hutu parishioners, and cognizant of what the results of a democratically elected government would bring, switched their support from the Tutsi class to the Hutu. Local elections held in 1959 brought an end to the Tutsi monopoly on power, and with the fighting that broke out shortly thereafter, Tutsi found themselves generally attacked throughout much of the country, while the Belgians looked on without intervening. Thousands of Tutsi were massacred, while hundreds of thousands of Tutsi fled the country in waves from 1959-1962.

The Post-Colonial Era

By 1962, a national government was elected, with the Hutu nationalist, Gregory Kayabanda the President. His goal was to complete the sweep of Tutsi rule and to install Hutu from his clan in the south of the country. The slogan "Hutu Power," denoting the reservation of government positions for Hutu, was born during this period. And even as the Hutu were consolidating their control over the government, and the elimination of Tutsi from all positions of power, the converse was occurring in Burundi in which a Tutsi military regime was successful in repressing popular Hutu movements, at the cost of hundreds of thousands of Hutu lives.

The "ethnic cleansing" of Tutsi in the early 1960's led to an exile population that was spread across Uganda, Zaire, Burundi, and Tanzania. When Tutsi attempted to strike back in 1963, there

were severe reprisals, and thousands of Tutsi were again killed, with still more fleeing into exile. Ultimately, after successive waves of such events, some 200,000 Tutsi fled—growing to a refugee population of some 600,000 by 1990 scattered across the Great Lakes Region.

Tutsi who remained in Rwanda were tolerated if they confined their activities to their business or agriculture; they lost opportunities for higher education, military, or government positions. In Burundi, the reverse was true; here, the minority Tutsi were favored in the civil service, higher education, and, most significantly, in the military. The expression of anti-Tutsi sentiment in Rwanda was generally confined to educated Hutu who might have felt themselves to be rivals for Tutsi positions. Peasant farmers who had lived in close proximity with Tutsi farmers, who had intermarried with them, were less prone to sentiments of ethnic hatred.

In 1972, the southern Hutu regime was overthrown in a military coup led by Major General Juvenal Habyarimana, with allegiances to northern Hutu clans. It was this new elite that consolidated its power over the government, the military, and the economy in the course of the next twenty years. Tutsi were permitted, indeed encouraged, to engage in business activities, especially those that profited the new Hutu elite. A measure of ethnic harmony was installed as tension now shifted between southern and northern Hutus.

Meanwhile, Tutsi in exile faced an uncertain fate elsewhere in the Great Lakes Region. Their fortunes rose under President Mobutu of Zaire, who used them as a means of controlling his opponents in Kivu, the easternmost region of Zaire, and who permitted them to prosper. In Uganda, they were out of favor with President Obote, but when he was overthrown by Yoweri Museveni, it was Rwandan Tutsi who helped form and staff his armies. By 1990, the average Ugandan came to regard Rwandan Tutsi exiles with suspicion, and the Ugandans began to place pressure on them to return to Rwanda.

Escalation Toward Genocide—Unheeded Warnings

Conditions in Rwanda entered a difficult economic period by 1990, especially after the drought of 1989. The leaders of the Tutsi community in Uganda estimated that the time was right for them to make a military return to Rwanda—especially after their overtures for a peaceful return had been rebuffed by President Habyarimana, who had stated that there was not enough room in Rwanda for them.

In 1990, Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) units, trained and supported in Uganda, ignored signs from President Habyarimana that he might be willing to negotiate and RPF forces invaded Rwanda. It took the intervention of French troops (see essay entitled “The World Fails to Respond” for an explanation of French involvement in Rwanda) to stop the RPF march on Kigali, and the RPF was forced to retreat to the north.

After two years of inconclusive fighting against the RPF and threatened with international sanctions, President Habyarimana agreed to international negotiations, which took place in Arusha, Tanzania in 1992 and 1993. The resulting Arusha Accords (June 24, 1993) put in place a process whereby opposition parties, including those representing Hutu from the south and those representing

Tutsi, would be allowed to be formed and to compete for seats in a national parliament. Elections were to be held for the presidency as well, and units of the RPF were to be integrated into the Rwandan Army. A certain number of government ministries were to be reserved for the opposition.

Despite his public support for the Arusha Accords, President Habyarimana delayed the implementation of the Accords upon his return to Rwanda. Pushed by his political opponents, by the RPF, and by the international community on one side, he came under attack on the other side by Hutu extremists arguing against the accords. The extremists were removed from positions of command in the army and government, but were permitted to unleash vicious propagandistic attacks that were soon followed by unofficial units of militant Hutu who began to attack and slaughter Tutsi civilians in various regions. The countdown to the genocide had begun.

The Genocide Unleashed

Beginning in July, 1993, anti-Tutsi inflammatory rhetoric from Radio Mille Collines¹ succeeded in creating a polarized climate of fear and hatred. Hutu extremists urged the elimination of Tutsi from Rwanda, using euphemisms for murder in their calls for action, and accusing moderate Hutu of betraying their cause.

In April of 1994, President Habyarimana found himself unable to extend his equivocation any further. He returned to Arusha, Tanzania, with the apparent intention of finalizing an agreement that would bring about a democratically elected government. Faced with the possibility that their twenty year monopoly of power would end, Hutu extremists within the ruling government circles apparently decided upon the most extreme solution. They had already been preparing for a generalized attack upon the Tutsi, upon their moderate Hutu opponents, and upon all human rights workers and the intellectuals. The trigger needed to unleash the radical Hutu militia who had been armed and trained for this action—the arming and training having been carried out in part by French advisors—was to be the assassination of the President of Rwanda and the President of Burundi as they returned from Arusha. This was accomplished when the airplane they were traveling in was brought down by a missile on return to Kigali, April 6, 1994. This marked the beginning of the genocide.

Within one hour of the downing of President Habyarimana's jet, blockades were set up in Kigali, militia manned the blockades, and attacks upon Tutsi, human rights workers, opposition politicians and moderate Hutu, had begun. To the world, the killings that began in Kigali and that spread throughout Rwanda, were testimony to the irrational "tribal" hatred and bloodthirstiness of Africans. Given this scenario of such hatred, what point would there be in intervening? What the subsequent investigations have revealed is that the killings were not spontaneous expressions of inevitable hatred, but a well-orchestrated, patterned genocide, planned for and prepared by extremists—indeed, ethnic supremacists to be sure—but essentially extremists concerned with holding onto power and wealth they had come to control after twenty years in power. The "tribal" card was played by these extremists who accused any Hutu who did not join in their cause of betraying Hutu, and used propaganda and fear—the twin tactics of Nazis and Fascists in Europe—to intimidate many into joining the killing. Those who resisted were themselves brutally murdered.

The pattern had been established during the two years immediately prior to the genocide, when extremist Hutu bands, operating with the approval of the Habyarimana regime, would go to a hillside community, demand that the local authorities mobilize the Hutu population, and then gather up the Tutsi to be killed. Despite human rights reports about such events, nothing was done to bring them to a halt. The radio broadcasts that encouraged such attacks before the genocide were multiplied after the death of the President, encouraging listeners to kill all Tutsi and any who opposed the killings. Civilians, both willing and unwilling, joined in the slaughter, using machetes to kill longtime neighbors. Men, women, children, the elderly, even infants were killed indiscriminately. Scenes of horror multiplied, and traditional sanctuaries such as churches, hospitals, and orphanages became the scenes for horrific bloodbaths. In particular, rape was used as a tool of genocide (see the essay entitled "Rape as a Weapon"). At the end of the three month period, one out of every three Tutsi on the face of the globe had been murdered in the genocide.

Acts of Resistance and Acts of Cowardice

Although individual acts of courage were many, and most remain unrecorded, the history of the early days of the genocide was marked by the rapid flight of the Westerners and other foreigners. The way was then open for the Hutu militias, known as the Interahamwe (or, "those who fight together") to have their way.

Among the first to resist the genocide were members of the UN Peacekeeping contingent. Belgian guards tried to protect the Prime Minister of Rwanda, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, who was known as a moderate Hutu voice. The ten Belgians surrendered to numerically superior Rwandan armed units, and were then shot. As a result of the killings, the Belgians ordered their contingent of UN peacekeepers out of the country immediately. The Belgians were the only UN contingent that were heavily armed. The remaining lightly armed and ill-prepared soldiers, numbering 2,500, were no match for the highly armed and trained militias. To prevent the genocide in Kigali, the peacekeepers required rapid and highly seasoned reinforcements. General Romeo Dallaire, the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) General in Kigali, and UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali called for reinforcements and equipment. In one of the great historical betrayals of conscience, the Security Council, led by the United States at the urging of Belgium, voted to withdraw the peacekeepers, leaving a small contingent of 270 in Kigali who protected some refugees in a stadium and who assisted with protection of expatriates. The flight out of Rwanda had begun for anyone who could escape.

The only impediments to the massacres lay in the consciences of some individuals, many of whom died in refusing to participate in the killing, and in the opposition military forces of the Tutsi RPF. The Tutsi leader of the Butare administrative region, a man named Jean-Baptiste Habyarimana, refused to participate in the genocide in the early weeks of April. Despite widespread murder throughout Rwanda, the genocide was delayed in Butare because of his leadership against the killing. It was only later in May, after his forced removal and replacement by a militant Hutu, that the genocide spread to Butare.

French military advisors had aided the Government of Rwanda by expanding and training thousands of new troops (see essay entitled "Supplying the Weapons"). As the fighting against the

RPF broke out after the assassination of the President, French advisors and weapons were used in support of the FAR (Forces Armées de Rwanda)—the Rwandan government forces. The collaboration in this fighting was justified by the French on the grounds that their newfound ally, Rwanda, was being subjected to attack by a foreign body—the RPF, now linked to the anglophone international community after residing in Uganda. In addition, the RPF were supported by English-speaking Ugandans. As evidence of the genocide emerged, the French defended their position on the grounds that they were aiding a war effort against invaders, not supporting a genocide. In truth, there was no difference between the two.

The French were not the only ones to abdicate a moral position in April and May of 1994, as hundreds of thousands of people were slaughtered. The evidence of genocide became clear by the end of April when thousands of bodies were seen floating down the Kagera River. The evidence continued to mount, and U.S. intelligence was aware of the genocide by the end of April. The U.S. position that set the tone for the rest of the world was that intervention would be politically suicidal, especially after the negative public reaction to the killing of American soldiers in Somalia. Thus, the U.S. State Department refused to acknowledge publicly that the genocide was occurring for fear it would be required to meet its obligations to the United Nations Convention on Genocide (see essays entitled “What Is Genocide” and “The World Fails to Respond”). Without U.S. support, no UN peacekeeping operation could move forward.

By the middle of May, the UN Security Council finally authorized the sending of peacekeeping troops and heavy weapons; however, by late June they had still not been deployed. For weeks the authorization remained stalled as weapons were held back by the Pentagon and as the UN dragged its feet in financing the weapons and mobilizing the troops. At last, after a particularly horrible case of orphans being slaughtered came to public light, the French decided to intervene in late June and sent troops into southwestern Rwanda—a region not yet under RPF control. The intervention saved a relatively small number of lives—at the same time permitting the bulk of the Rwandan government and armed militias to escape across the border into Zaire. The consequences of the genocide were about to take place.

The Humanitarian Crisis Unfolds

The advance of the RPF was rapid, at times brutal, with some incidents of civilians being killed; in general, it was a disciplined reconquest. The Hutu population, fearing for its lives after the genocide, fled. Out of about seven million Hutu, two million went into exile, primarily to Zaire, and many into Tanzania and Burundi. Another two million were internally displaced in the borders of Rwanda. The two million who wound up in Zaire were most at risk. The volcanic soil of the environment around Goma was hard, water not readily available, and the Zairians were in no position to welcome these new refugees. The result was that unhealthy camps became the breeding grounds for cholera, typhoid, and dysentery. Tens of thousands of refugees died while the international community, no longer faced with the need to intervene militarily, mobilized its resources rapidly and mounted a massive aid operation. Most of the Rwandan Hutu refugees were saved, along with the radical militia, the ex-Rwandan government, and its armed forces, the FAR.

The exiled forces formed the kernel of a newly constituted government that eventually took control of the refugee camps, rearmed itself, and fostered attacks upon the indigenous Tutsi of eastern Zaire (most of whom had been living in Zaire for 60 to 100 years). As a result, the Zairian Tutsi armed themselves and joined a rebel movement originating in Shaba Province of Zaire, unleashing a war that spread throughout Zaire against the corrupt Mobutu regime in the early months of 1997.

The leaders of the genocide who fled to Zaire were to find themselves conscripted in Mobutu's wars against his internal enemies. Some of the leaders of the genocide who fled abroad were apprehended, and some were brought to trial before the International Criminal Tribunal, set shortly after the genocide (see essay entitled "Justice for the Victims?"). Within Rwanda, some 90,000 people were arrested by 1997, and charged with complicity in the genocide. At no point did the world powers that control the United Nations agree to employ force to take back control of the refugee camps, to separate the genocide leaders and intimidators from the genuine refugees, or to apprehend those responsible for the deaths of between 800,000 and one million people.

Conclusion: "Never Again"?


The crime of genocide was outlawed after World War II, and an international Convention on Genocide was created to bring an end to this practice. Instead, faced with the reality of the deaths of eighteen American soldiers in Somalia and ten Belgian soldiers in Kigali, the political will of the world's leaders proved to be totally devoid of moral principle, while the French who eventually decided to intervene (and did so without the loss of a single life), abetted in the genocide by permitting the perpetrators to escape.

The hard lessons of this history are that a propaganda that demonizes a group can have deadly consequences, and that allowing attacks upon civilians to go unpunished encourages further crimes against humanity. The battle to engage political leaders to act upon principle is far from won, whatever the Conventions the nations of the world may have signed, whatever the rhetoric their leaders may employ. Far from "never again," genocide is an unthinkable horror that is still with us.

Discussion Questions

1. In your opinion, what were the early warning signs? Can key moments be identified where the conflict was clearly escalating? At what points could decisive action have proven successful?
2. What is the link between colonialism and our modern notions of "tribalism"? In the video, scenes from the colonial period in Rwanda show process of the creation of ethnic identity (Hutu, Tutsi, Twa) by the Belgians. How can we use this information to break down stereotypes of African tribalism?
3. When confronted with the knowledge of large scale violence, we often ask "how could ordinary people commit such horrible carnage?" After watching the video and reviewing the history of the region, discuss the forces that compel people to commit genocidal acts.

¹ For samples of hate radio speech from Radio Mille Collines, see *Genocide in Rwanda: A Collective Memory*, edited by John A. and Carol Pott Berry, 1995.



WHAT IS GENOCIDE?

Introduction

The genocide in Rwanda resulted in the massacre of between 800,000 and one million Tutsi and moderate Hutu in 1994. The carnage in Rwanda may have seemed initially to outside observers to be “African tribal violence”; however, the planning and participation of the Rwandan military, local militias, and the civilian population demonstrate that *the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the Rwandan Tutsi* clearly qualifies the events in April, 1994, as genocide.

What is “Genocide”?

The word genocide was coined by the jurist Raphael Lemkin in 1944. The term comes from the Greek root words, “genos”, meaning race or tribe, and “cide”, meaning killing. The international legal definition of genocide is articulated in the **Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide** (Genocide Convention). Genocide consists of acts committed with the intention to destroy, wholly or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. Although this definition is very specific, the kinds of acts which constitute a crime under the Convention may also include any conspiracy or attempt to commit genocide, as well as any public incitement to commit genocide.

Evolution of the Genocide Convention and Adoption by the International Community

In the horrible aftermath of World War II, the international community learned of the murder of six million Jews at the hands of the Nazi regime. The calculated murder of the Jews and other targeted populations mobilized the international community to create the political will to say “never again” would mass murder of this type be tolerated. Raphael Lemkin, along with other international jurists and human rights organizations, led the vanguard of an international movement to create a legal covenant defining genocide as a crime against humanity and requiring intervention by the international community and punishment for the perpetrators. This legal covenant eventually became known as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

Much of the debate surrounding the creation of the Convention centered on the definition of genocide, and in particular, the question of whether political groups should be regarded as falling under the definition. Lemkin’s concept of genocide was broad, and he pushed for the term to apply to the intentional destruction of any group, including those of political affiliations. Conversely, the

Soviet Union argued for a narrower definition guided by the etymology of the term and that political groups should not be included. Ultimately, the drafters of the Convention decided that massacres of members of a political group were better prosecuted under traditional concepts of criminal law such as murder.

The Genocide Convention entered into force on January 12, 1951. It has since been signed and ratified by more than one hundred nations, including Rwanda. The United States of America signed the Genocide Convention on December 11, 1948, but the U.S. Congress took forty years to ratify it, with the Senate finally doing so on November 25, 1988.

When nations ratify international human rights conventions, they often impose reservations and understandings which limit or qualify their obligations under the treaty. In the case of the Genocide Convention, the U.S. has entered a reservation to Article IX, concerning the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice over disputes involving the interpretation of the Convention. As to its understanding of the Convention, the US notes that "acts in the course of armed conflict committed without the specific intent required by Article II are not sufficient to constitute genocide as defined by this Convention." The significance of this interpretation surfaced during April, 1994, when the US government's response to the genocide in Rwanda was influenced accordingly (see essay entitled, "The World Fails to Respond" for a discussion of this key point).

Determining the Occurrence of Genocide

Although the Genocide Convention clearly spells out what is meant by the term, in practice, there are a number of limitations which hamper its effectiveness to prevent genocide. The requirement that there be specific intent to destroy a racial, ethnic, or religious group is often difficult to prove as events are unfolding, despite early warning signals. Since genocide often takes place in the context of civil wars, as in the case of Rwanda and Cambodia, it is possible for contracting parties to argue that the killings are "political" rather than ethnic and thus do not fall under the definition provided by the Genocide Convention.

In general, nations are reluctant to assume the obligations provided under the Genocide Convention when doing so is not in their immediate national interests. Policies of non-intervention often enjoy wide popular support in democratic countries because of bystander indifference, lack of identification with the victims, and the perceived costs and risks of humanitarian intervention. In particular, the fear of casualties in distant countries (such as the deaths of American soldiers during the Somalia intervention) acts as a powerful deterrent.

Establishing the Pattern of Genocide in Rwanda

As mentioned in the film, *Forsaken Cries*, all the tools were in place in Rwandan society for the eventual genocide. Although the genocide in Rwanda was incredibly brutal and swift, it was, nonetheless, systematically planned and carried out, and conformed to the general pattern described in **The Seven Stages of Genocide**.

Beginning as early as 1990, plans were developed in Rwanda by a core group of leaders with ties to the President, Juvenal Habyarimana. Using *Kangura*, an extremist newspaper, and Radio Mille Collines, an equally extreme radio station, the architects of the genocide broadcast their message of hatred and exclusion across the countryside. Other means of spreading the message could be found in speeches, poetry and song in the period between 1990 and 1994.

Genocide requires weapons and organized killers, and these abounded in Rwanda prior to April, 1994. The organizers distributed weapons, both light arms and machetes, in the months prior to the genocide (see "Supplying the Weapons" essay). Private Hutu militias, known as Interahamwe ("those who fight together") were also created and trained as early as 1991. The first known massacre carried out by the Interahamwe occurred in Bugesera, Rwanda, in March, 1992. The Rwandan Army and the Rwandan Presidential Guard were also trained to kill, and used their authority and organizational skills to direct the Interahamwe, who carried out the murders.

The Tutsi victims could be easily targeted by the killers because all Rwandans were required to carry an identification card, instigated by the Belgians during the colonial period (see "History of Rwanda"). Under the peace negotiations in Arusha, Tanzania, the Rwandan government had agreed to abolish the mention of ethnicity on the identification cards, but this pledge was never carried out. Hutu militia and army members could thus set up checkpoints on roads and in other transportation areas to stop anyone attempting to pass, and could instantly find Tutsi, who were usually killed on the spot after April 6, 1994.

The pattern of genocide became especially clear in April when frightened Tutsi were herded systematically into churches, stadiums, and hospitals. These sites were used to collect large numbers of civilians, where they were killed over a period of several days. Many Tutsi believed that since they were being held in traditionally "safe" places, they would survive. This "collectivization" of Tutsi made it easier for the killers to exterminate large numbers of people—and to dispose of their bodies in group burial pits as well.

Confusion About the Nature of the Crimes—Cloaking the Genocide

How did the true nature of the genocide go unnamed during April, May and June of 1994, by the international community? Despite some information leaking out from the Great Lakes Region, and the availability of intelligence pointing to the nature of the crimes, the extremists employed a strategy to hide information about the truth, halt all communication with the outside world, and provide disinformation to sway the opinions of the international community.

Initially, the coverage by the major news media leading up to the outbreak of genocide on April 6 and 7, 1994, was limited. The violence in Kigali was typically portrayed as "mindless" and as the result of "ancient tribal hatred" rather than as part of a planned and organized genocide. Also, very few journalists were in Kigali at the time, and of these, none were broadcasting live television images of the murders. Many Africa correspondents were covering the elections in South Africa, and were not available in the immediate Great Lakes region to cover the unfolding genocide. By the end of April, however, press accounts began to pour out, documenting the true nature of the crimes, but still, very little television coverage was given to the events.

In addition, the Hutu government used press conferences to make misleading statements about the nature of the killing. Justin Mugenzi, the Rwandan Minister of Commerce for the Hutu regime, described the killings as a spontaneous eruption of outrage and shock upon hearing the news of the death of President Habyarimana.¹ The Hutu regime also forced moderate Hutu to go along with the misinformation campaign, and to produce false statements about the events in Kigali during the month of April, 1994. All this, in combination with the indifference of a majority of the international community, resulted in a three month denial period during which the UN Security Council debated whether genocide was really occurring. In the meantime, close to one million people died.

Discussion Questions

1. Do you agree with the decision to use a narrower definition of the term genocide, as advocated by the Soviet Union in the 1950's, or should intentional destruction of any group, including groups consisting of political affiliations, qualify as genocide? Why was this distinction made? Can you think of reasons the definition should be broadened as we enter the 21st century?
2. In an era of global communication, discuss the importance of television press coverage and its impact on government action and policy. How can activists demand earlier and better coverage of human rights violations, massacres, and genocide?
3. Using **The Seven Stages of Genocide** following this essay, devise a strategy of intervention by the international community for each of the seven stages. What should have been done in Rwanda during each stage of the genocide? What should the UN Security Council have done, and what should human rights organizations have done at each stage?

¹ See other accounts of misinformation propagated by the Hutu regime contained in *Rwanda: Death, Despair, and Defiance*, 1994, Africa Rights, London.



THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION

The following is an excerpt from the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Only the first nine articles appear, as these contain the most salient features of the Convention.

The Contracting Parties,

Having considered the declaration made by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution 96 (I) dated 11 December, 1946, that genocide is a crime under international law, contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations and condemned by the civilized world,

Recognizing that at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity, and

Being convinced that, in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge, international co-operation is required,

Hereby agree as hereinafter provided:

Article I

The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and punish.

Article II

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

- a. Killing members of the group;
- b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- c. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- d. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- e. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Article III

The following acts shall be punishable:

- a. Genocide;
- b. Conspiracy to commit genocide;
- c. Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
- d. Attempt to commit genocide;
- e. Complicity in genocide.

Article IV

Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.

Article V

The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention, and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III.

Article VI

Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.

Article VII

Genocide and the other acts enumerated in Article III shall not be considered as political crimes for the purpose of extradition. The Contracting Parties pledge themselves in such cases to grant extradition in accordance with their laws and treaties in force.

Article VIII

Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III.

Article IX

Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfillment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in Article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute.



THE SEVEN STAGES OF GENOCIDE

by Gregory H. Stanton

The International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines "genocide":

"In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such:

- a) Killing members of the group;
- b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group."

"The Following Acts shall be punishable:

- a) Genocide;
- b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
- c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
- d) Attempt to commit genocide;
- e) Complicity in genocide."

The Genocide Convention is sometimes misinterpreted as requiring the intent to destroy a whole national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such. Some genocides have fit that description, notably the Holocaust and the genocide in Rwanda. But most do not. Most are intended to destroy only part of a group. The Genocide Convention specifically includes the intentional killing of part of a group as genocide. It reaffirms this definition when it includes as among the acts that constitute genocide "deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part." Those who shrink from applying the term "genocide" usually ignore the "in part." Thus, intent to destroy a part of an ethnic group coupled with killing members of the group constitutes an act of genocide.

Intent

Criminal law distinguishes intent from motive. A murderer may have many motives—gaining property or eliminating a rival for power. But his intent is determined by the purpose of his act: Did he purposely kill the victim? Genocidal intent is determined by the purpose of the act: Did the killer purposely kill the victim because the victim was part of an ethnic group the killer intends to destroy, at least in part?

The motive of the killer to take the victim's property or to politically dominate the victim's group does not remove genocidal intent if the victim is chosen because of his ethnic, national, racial or religious group.

Genocidal intent does not require an overall plan. An act of genocide may arise in a culture that considers members of another group less than human, where killing members of that group is not considered murder. This is the culture of impunity characteristic of genocidal societies. In Burundi, Tutsi who kill Hutu have seldom been convicted or even arrested. Massacres are ethnic, intended to destroy parts of the other ethnic group.

The intent of the act of genocide does not have to be part of a plan to kill a whole group. If a killing is part of a genocidal massacre, where victims are killed because of their ethnic identity, it is an act of genocide even if only a part of the group (intellectuals, officers, leaders) is targeted.

Acts of Genocide

The crime of genocide is defined by the Genocide Convention as "acts of genocide." It does not exist apart from those acts. A pattern of acts of genocide is frequently called "genocide" and evidence of such a pattern of ethnic, racial, or religious massacres is strong evidence of genocidal intent.

THE GENOCIDAL PROCESS

Prevention of genocide requires a structural understanding of the genocidal process. Genocide has seven stages or operational processes. The first stages precede later stages, but continue to operate throughout the genocidal process. Each stage reinforces the others. A strategy to prevent genocide should attack each stage, each process. The seven stages of genocide are classification, symbolization, dehumanization, organization, polarization, identification, and extermination.

Classification

All languages and cultures require classification—division of the natural and social world into categories. We distinguish and classify objects and people. All cultures have categories to distinguish between us and them, between members of our group, and others. We treat different

categories of people differently. Racial and ethnic classification may be defined by absurdly detailed laws—the Nazi Nuremberg laws, the “one drop” laws of segregation in America, or apartheid classification laws in South Africa. Racist societies often prohibit mixed categories and outlaw miscegenation. Bipolar societies are the most likely to experience genocide. In Rwanda and Burundi, children acquire the ethnicity of their fathers, either Hutu or Tutsi. Mixed marriages do not result in mixed race children, according to Rwandan and Burundian custom.

Symbolization

We use symbols to name and signify our classifications. We name some people Hutu and others Tutsi, or Jewish, or Gypsy. Sometimes physical characteristics—skin color or nose shape—become symbols for classification. Other symbols, like customary dress or facial scars, are socially imposed by groups upon their own members. Genocidal governments often require members of a targeted group to wear an identifying symbol or distinctive clothing—e.g., the yellow Star of David for the Jews in Germany under Nazi rule. The Khmer Rouge forced people from the Eastern Zone to wear a blue-checked scarf, marking them for forced relocation and elimination. Without symbols for our classifications, they would become literally insignificant. Yellow stars became insignificant in Denmark because non-Jewish Danes also chose to wear them under German occupation during World War II, rejecting the Nazi classification system.

Dehumanization

Classification and symbolization are fundamental operations in all cultures. They become stages of genocide only when combined with dehumanization. Denial of the humanity of others is the step that permits killing with impunity. The universal human abhorrence of murder of members of one's own group is overcome by treating the victims as less than human. In incitements to genocide, the target groups are called disgusting animal names—Nazi propaganda called Jews “rats” or “vermin;” Rwandan Hutu hate radio referred to Tutsi as “cockroaches.” Bodies of genocide victims are often mutilated to express this denial of humanity. Such atrocities then become the justification for revenge killings, because they are evidence that the killers must be monsters, not human beings themselves.

Organization

Genocide is always collective because it derives its impetus from group identification. It is always organized, often by states, but also by militias and hate groups. Planning need not be elaborate: Hindu mobs may hunt down Sikhs or Muslims, led by local leaders. Methods of killing need not be complex—Tutsi in Rwanda died from machetes; Muslim Chams in Cambodia from hoe-blades to the back of the neck (“bullets must not be wasted” was the rule at Cambodian extermination prisons, expressing the dehumanization of the victims). The social organization of genocide varies by culture. It reached its most mechanized, bureaucratic form in the Nazi death camps. But it is always organized, whether by the Nazi SS or the Rwandan Interahamwe. Death squads may be trained for mass murder, as in Rwanda, and then force everyone to participate, spreading hysteria and overcoming individual resistance.

Polarization

Genocide proceeds in a downward cycle of killings until, like a whirlpool, it reaches the vortex of mass murder. Killings by one group may provoke revenge killings by the other. Such massacres are aimed at polarization, the systematic elimination of moderates who would slow the cycle. The first to be killed in a genocide are moderates from the perpetrator's group who might oppose the extremists: the Hutu Supreme Court Chief Justice and Prime Minister in Rwanda, and the Tutsi Archbishop in Burundi. Extremists target moderate leaders and their families. The center cannot hold, and the extremists take over, polarizing the conflict until negotiated settlement is impossible.

Identification

Lists of victims are usually drawn up during genocide. Houses are marked, and maps are made. Individuals are forced to carry identification cards containing their ethnic or religious origin, because this greatly speeds up the slaughter. In Germany, the identification of Jews, defined by law, was performed by a methodical bureaucracy. In Rwanda, identity cards showed each person's ethnicity and Tutsi were pulled from cars at roadblocks and murdered. Throwing away the cards did not help, because anyone who could not prove he was Hutu was presumed to be Tutsi. Hutu militiamen conducted crude mouth exams to test claims to Hutu identity.

Extermination

The final step, the final solution, is extermination. It is considered extermination rather than murder because the victims are not considered human. They are vermin, rats or cockroaches. Killing is described by euphemisms of purification: "ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia, "ratonade" (rat extermination) in Algeria. All members of the alien group are killed, including children. Because they are not considered persons, their bodies are buried in mass graves or burnt like garbage.

PREVENTION

A full strategy for preventing genocide should include an attack on each of genocide's operational processes.

Classification may be attacked either through devaluation of the distinctive features used to classify (e.g., amalgamation of regional dialects and accents by exposure to mass media or standardized education) or through the use of transcendent categories, such as common nationality or common humanity. Promotion of mixed categories, such as the financial incentives for inter-caste marriages in Tamil Nadu, India, may help break down group endogamy, but do not combat genocide in bipolar societies where mixed categories have no recognition. In bipolar societies, transcendent institutions like the Catholic Church should actively campaign against ethnic classifications. Special effort should be made to keep such institutions from being captured and divided by the same forces that divide the society, e.g. through hierarchical discipline from Rome for the Roman Catholic Church.

Symbolization can be attacked by legally forbidding use of hate symbols (e.g. swastikas) or ethnic classification words. "Nigger" or "kaffir" as racial expletives may be outlawed as "hate speech." Group marking like tribal scarring may be outlawed, like gang clothing. The problem is that legal limitations on hate speech will fail if unsupported by popular cultural enforcement. Though Hutu and Tutsi were forbidden words in Burundi until the 1980's, the prohibition had little effect, since other euphemisms and code-words replaced them. Prohibition may even become counter-productive, as part of an ideology of denial, that prevents people from naming, discussing and overcoming deep cultural divisions.

Dehumanization should be opposed openly whenever it shows its ugly face. Genocidal societies lack constitutional protection for countervailing speech, and should be treated differently than democracies. Hate radio stations should be shut down and hate propaganda banned. Although restrictions on free speech are not necessary in a healthy polity, even in democracies hate speech should be actively exposed and opposed. Direct incitements to genocide should be outlawed. Incitement to genocide is not protected speech, and hate crimes and atrocities must be promptly punished. Impunity breeds contempt for law, and emboldens the perpetrators, who can literally get away with murder.

Organizations that commit acts of genocide should be banned and membership in them made a crime. Freedom of association in a democratic society should not be misconstrued as protecting membership in criminal organizations. At Nuremberg, membership in the SS was itself prosecuted. Similarly, the Interahamwe group, Sans Echee, and other genocidal hate groups should be outlawed, and their members arrested and tried for conspiracy to commit genocide. The UN should impose arms embargoes on governments or militias that commit genocide. Because arms embargoes are difficult to enforce, for Rwanda, the UN established an international commission to investigate and document violations of the regional arms embargo. The UN may also require member states to freeze the assets of persons who organize and finance genocidal groups.

Polarization can be fought by providing financial and technical aid to the moderate center. It may mean security protection for moderate leaders, or assistance to human rights groups. Assets of extremists may be seized, and visas for international travel denied to them. Coups d'etat by extremists should be immediately opposed by international sanctions.

Identification of victims considerably speeds genocide. When identity cards proclaim a victim's ethnic or religious group, or when victims are forced to wear yellow stars, the killing is made more efficient. When death lists are drawn up, the international community should recognize that genocide is imminent, and mobilize for armed intervention. Those identified should be given asylum and assistance in fleeing their persecutors. Had the U.S. or Britain in Palestine accepted all Jewish immigrants, millions of lives might have been saved from the Holocaust.

Extermination, whether carried out by governments or by patterned mob violence, can only be stopped by force. Armed intervention must be rapid and overwhelming. Safe areas should be established with real military protection. An intervention force without robust rules of engagement, such as the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) during April, 1994, or the UN Protection Force in Bosnia (UNPROFOR), is worse than no protection, because it gives genocide victims a false hope of security in churches or stadiums, delaying their own organization for self-defense. In

bipolar societies, separation into self-defense zones is the best protection for both groups, particularly if international troops can create a buffer zone between them.

Experience with UN peacekeeping has shown that humanitarian intervention should be carried out by a multinational force authorized by the UN, but led by UN member states, rather than by the UN itself. The Military Staff Committee envisioned in Article 47 of the UN Charter has never been organized, and the UN does not have a standing army. The strongest member states must therefore shoulder this responsibility in conjunction with other UN member states. The U.S. is now promoting the organization of an African Crisis Response Initiative composed of African military units coordinated and financed by the U.S., Europeans, and other powers.

PUNISHMENT

When Adolf Hitler was asked if his planned invasion of Poland was a violation of international law, he scoffed, "Who ever heard of the extermination of the Armenians?"

Impunity—literally, getting away with murder—is the weakest link in the chains that restrain genocide. In Rwanda, Hutu were never arrested and brought to trial for massacres of Tutsi that began months before the genocide of April, 1994. In Burundi, Tutsi youth gangs have never been tried for killing Hutu. And Burundian judges are nearly all Tutsi, as are the army and police. They seldom, if ever, convict their own.

Social order abhors a vacuum. When courts do not dispense justice, the victims have no recourse but revenge. In societies with histories of ethnic violence, the cycle of killing will eventually spiral downward into the vortex of genocide.

In such societies, the international community should fill the legal vacuum by creating tribunals to prosecute and try genocide. That has been done for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. We need to create a Permanent International Criminal Tribunal that will have worldwide jurisdiction to try genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. The Tribunal must be supported by effective institutions to arrest and imprison those indicted and convicted by the Tribunal. Only such a permanent court will provide the deterrent effect necessary to give pause to those planning future genocides.

Such a tribunal, coupled with effective international organizations to arrest and punish the perpetrators of genocide, could be the greatest step forward in mankind's long battle against genocide. The strongest antidote to genocide is justice.



THE WORLD FAILS TO RESPOND: COMPLICITY IN GENOCIDE

Introduction

Between April and June, 1994, the Central African country of Rwanda experienced the swiftest recorded genocide in history. Tragically, the response by different governments like that of the United States, international organizations like the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity and non-governmental organizations like Amnesty International was too little too late.

In trying to find an explanation for the genocide in Rwanda, we point to the failure of the international community to decisively respond. But who is the international community and who ultimately is to be held accountable for this failure to respond?

Who is the "International Community"?

When we refer to the international community, we are referring to a complex mix of actors that are involved in a given situation. Each is independent, with its own unique interests and motivations for action, but can act in unison or complimentary fashion with other actors, depending on the political will within them to do so. Governments, international organizations like the United Nations (UN) and Organization of African Unity (OAU), non-governmental organizations, and various media all play a crucial role in shaping opinion, devising strategies, and mounting an effective response to human rights violations.

In reality, only a handful of the most powerful nations in the international system, however, set the parameters for public policy, while international organizations like the UN are nothing more than the sum of the will of their member states. Non-governmental organizations monitor conditions, devise policy recommendations, and mobilize constituencies to lobby governments to act. When all these institutions act in tandem, with a common goal, the flow of history can be altered and thousands of lives can be saved. When they are divided, or lack consensus, or are driven by their own self-interests, action can translate into chaos.

As part of the complex international system, each of these actors has direct or implicit responsibility for their impact upon genocidal conditions. As signatories to the Genocide Convention¹, governments are committed to respond to genocide (see essay, "What is Genocide"). International organizations like the OAU and non-governmental organizations like Amnesty International have also committed themselves to preventing and stopping genocide and upholding

the UN Convention. The international media, while committed principally to the reporting of accurate information, also has the professional task of alerting the world about areas of potential risk. All of these institutions could have and should have prevented the genocide in Rwanda.

The Failure of Governments

Individual governments have always responded far more vigorously to their United Nations obligations when it has served their national interest to do so. The genocide in Rwanda was, sadly, no different. In addition to initially debating whether the events in Rwanda constituted genocide or acts of genocidal intent, individual governments also failed to stop the flow of arms into Rwanda or punish businesses which were providing equipment which, in some cases, was being used in the killings.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The U.S. role in Central Africa has historically been confined to support of the Cold War ally found in Mobutu Sese Seko's thirty year administration in Zaire. With the end of the Cold War, the US sphere of interest in the region has broadened to include support for Uganda, with growing security and business ties forged there. The commercial U.S. interest in the tiny nations of Rwanda and Burundi, however, has been and remains minimal, given the historic colonial dominance of Belgium and France.

Yet despite the lack of strong economic interests in the tiny nations of Rwanda and Burundi, the Clinton Administration's failure to act bi-laterally or multi-laterally first to prevent and then later to stop the genocide constitutes a grave moral failure. As the world's leading military power and one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the U.S. was one of the few governments that could have marshaled support for increased funding, material, supplies, transportation and troops to bolster the UNAMIR operation. Instead, the U.S. choose to lead a movement within the Security Council to reduce UNAMIR troops. This failure in leadership was followed by a second grave error when the Clinton Administration failed to label the genocide for what it was, resorting instead to using vague terminology that enabled our government to evade the responsibility to take action.

Lack of Intervention: The Somalia Syndrome

The deaths of eighteen U.S. troops in Somalia, in October, 1993, during the peace operations in that country threw long, dark shadows on the Clinton administration's ability to respond to the situation in Rwanda. Somalia had come to represent a symbol of U.S. fears of engagement and "mission creep" (where a peacekeeping mission shifts to a nation-building, peacemaking effort) as well as a symbol of the failure of intervention into bloody civil wars under anarchic conditions. The Clinton administration dramatically reversed policy towards the Somalia mission once it perceived the U.S. public's commitment to continued engagement was waning.

Meanwhile, despite massacres throughout Rwanda during December and January of 1993 and 1994, the administration was hesitant to acknowledge the growing tension and danger in Kigali. The U.S. Embassy in Kigali failed to label these massacres as genocidal, sending signals to the Hutu militia and Rwandan Army that no action would be taken by the US if further killing was perpetrated.

During the months preceding the genocide, plans were underway in the UN for deployment of the UN Assistance Mission to Rwanda, or UNAMIR.² As of December, 1993, 2,500 UN Peacekeepers were in Rwanda, and it was hoped that this small force would stabilize the region around Kigali. The US mistakenly placed its hope in this UNAMIR operation, which was more a peace-keeping than a peace-making contingent.

The U.S. also feared that to mobilize troops or make contingency plans for an intervention would derail the peace process taking place in Arusha, Tanzania.³ Despite intelligence from a variety of sources indicating that plans were in place for genocide against Tutsi and moderate Hutu, there was little attention paid to the matter, let alone any proactive planning within the National Security Council, the State Department, or at the UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations (UNDPKO).

Shortly after the downing of President Habyarimana's plane on April 6, 1994, barricades were set up in Kigali where young Hutu militia identified and murdered Tutsi and Hutu moderates. Department of State employees in Kigali were eyewitnesses to the systematic nature of the killings, and were reporting back to Washington concerning the details of the genocide. Despite cables and intelligence reports returning to the State Department within the early weeks of April, no condemnation or labeling of the atrocities as "genocide" was made by the U.S. government.

In early April, when ten Belgian peacekeeping troops were murdered as they attempted to protect the Prime Minister of Rwanda in Kigali, the Belgian government decided to pull out its remaining peacekeeping troops. The Belgian Foreign Minister then telephoned U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher and asked the U.S. to provide leadership for reducing all forces within UNAMIR, so as not to make the Belgians look bad. The US acquiesced, and despite requests from General Romeo Dallaire (the UNAMIR Force Commander in Kigali), and from the UN Secretary General for an increase in troops, the Security Council voted to withdraw all but 450 (eventually reduced to 270) of the peacekeepers. This reduced force was to guard expatriates and assist with the evacuation of foreigners from the capital. As mentioned in the video, *Forsaken Cries*, a massive increase in deaths occurred immediately after the withdrawal of UNAMIR troops.

Despite public rhetoric from President Clinton that called upon the Rwandan army and the RPF to agree to an immediate cease-fire and return to negotiations, behind the scenes activity was focused on blocking the further dispatch of UN troops to Rwanda. The U.S. policy decisions concerning the situation in Rwanda were made during a pivotal State Department meeting where members of the Africa Bureau, Bureau of International Organizations, and National Security Staff made the decision to ignore General Dallaire's request for increasing the size and scope of the peacekeeping mandate, and to support the Belgians by withdrawing the UNAMIR forces. The resultant overall policy decision had been made: the national security interests of the U.S. in Rwanda were not at stake, and the situation did not warrant intervention, even on purely moral grounds.

Genocide, or "Acts of Genocide"?

In April of 1994, individuals in the legal advisors office of the State Department warned against labeling the massacres as "genocide." The crafters of the subsequent policy toward Rwanda decided instead to use the amorphous term "acts of genocide," citing a difficulty in determining the intent behind the mass killings (despite early evidence to the contrary). The rationale behind this policy was to first and foremost avoid negative public reactions triggered by the intervention in Somalia; but the second reason was to avoid the legal obligation to prevent the genocide and to punish those responsible, as outlined in the Convention on Genocide.

The Clinton administration did not officially acknowledge that genocide was being perpetrated until June 10, when Department of State spokesperson Christine Shelly referred to the events in Rwanda as such. Members of the Clinton administration, including the President himself, issued appeals to both sides of the Rwandan conflict; the National Security Council chief, Anthony Lake, called for all parties to use their power to effect an immediate cessation of violence, while Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights, John Shattuck, advocated a United Nations-directed inquiry to establish responsibility for the massacres.

By the time the official designation of genocide was given in June, hundreds of thousands had already been butchered, and any possibility of rapid response was eliminated by lengthy deliberations at the UN Security Council. In August, 1994, the U.S. Government assuaged its guilt and failure to act by launching a multi-lateral humanitarian aid effort to help the subsequent exodus of Hutu refugees. While the relief effort did save lives during one of the most rapid refugee movements in history, it was no substitute for action that might have saved hundreds of thousands of lives during the genocide of April-June, 1994. Ironically, the humanitarian intervention effort cost up to three times as much in financial terms as would have been needed for an early preventive intervention.

FRANCE

The French presence in Rwanda and Burundi did not hinge upon strategic and commercial interests; rather, the French maintained a presence in Rwanda to help bolster their overall influence in Africa, in an attempt to prop up their international stature. With the threat of the RPF invasion from anglophone Uganda, part of the rationale behind French support for the Habyarimana government was to retain Rwanda as a francophone country within Central Africa. The French had to demonstrate their loyalty to francophone countries, or else be viewed with suspicion by other francophone African leaders. On a more personal level, the relationship between the French President's family and that of the Rwandan President's family was extremely close, and ties of loyalty had to be preserved.

France became the closest military ally of the Habyarimana regime, moving into the vacuum created when the Belgians cut off all military and development assistance in the fall of 1990. Some 300 French troops were deployed in 1990 and increased to nearly 700 by early 1993. The troops were there ostensibly to facilitate the evacuation of French nationals and other western nationals as the war with the RPF escalated. But these troops also saw to it that President Habyarimana's widow

and fifteen members of her family were evacuated to France during the RPF invasion, despite the family's involvement with planning genocide. Other key Hutu architects of the genocide were protected by France, and their role in training and supplying arms to the militias has been well established.

As the Rwandan Patriotic Army forces advanced, the French government promoted the idea of an intervention force to create a safe haven for persons fleeing the fighting. France eventually mounted Operation Turquoise which allowed the former Rwandan government which had committed the genocide to safely flee to Zaire, with most of their weapons and their money. In addition the French also received representatives from the former government as representatives of an official government in exile.

While the actions of the French during Operation Turquoise may have saved some lives and stabilized the situation for the Hutu refugees fleeing Rwanda, their actions also enabled thousands of Hutu Interahamwe militia forces to infiltrate the refugee camps, gaining a strong grip on the Hutu civilians. These "intimidators" eventually consolidated their control over the camps, and prevented the return of Hutu families, in some instances diverting food aid from the people who needed it and distributing it instead to militia members.

BELGIUM

As mentioned in the film, *Forsaken Cries*, the Belgian colonials shaped the subsequent pattern of Hutu-Tutsi division. Despite a rather dismal record of mismanagement and exploitation during the colonial period, the Belgian government after 1990 was making attempts to rectify the injustices of the past. Belgium had been providing development assistance and had ceased the sale of arms to Rwanda in an effort to prevent further build-up of hostilities there.

Belgium supported the Arusha Accord negotiations, and also contributed vastly to the UNAMIR mission in an effort to promote peace. However, after the murder of ten Belgian peacekeeping troops, who were attempting to protect Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana, all Belgian troops were withdrawn on 12 April, 1994. Public sentiment in Belgium prevented further troop contributions to the UNAMIR mission, and Belgium persuaded the U.S. to call for a withdrawal of all UNAMIR troops, so that Belgium would not be accused of cowardice.

Failure of International Institutions

THE UNITED NATIONS (UN)

Rwanda's abysmal human rights record had been investigated and condemned by a UN International Commission of Inquiry in January of 1993. The Commission's findings implicated President Habyarimana in the killings of several hundred political opponents. In May 1993, the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions for the UN Commission for Human Rights issued a report on the grave situation in Rwanda and called for urgent action by the international community. Among the recommendations were the following: 1) take steps to prevent extrajudicial executions;

2) mount a national reconciliation campaign; 3) dismantle all violent organizations; and 4) reform the judicial system. No action was taken on the recommendations.

On August 4, 1993, an OAU brokered agreement in Arusha resulted in the formal cessation of fighting and the deployment of the United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) in November of that year following approval from the Security Council in October. UNAMIR's mandate was limited to monitoring the peace accord and investigating and reporting human rights violations by the police and gendarmerie only.⁴

Six months before the killings started, one of the chief planners of the genocide defected to the United Nations and explained the preparations that were in progress in detail. A **cable including details of the genocide** was sent to UN headquarters by the defector, along with a memo describing the plans. In addition to the aforementioned cable, the leader of UNAMIR forces in Rwanda, General Romeo Dallaire, sent a cable to UN headquarters warning that violence was impending and requested more forces be deployed immediately. The United Nations Secretary General, the Security Council, and the international community failed to heed and act upon all these warnings.

On the morning of April 6, 1994, only an hour after President Habyarimana's plane had been shot down, the Interahamwe forces systematically set up roadblocks in the streets of Kigali and began searching households and systematically executing Tutsi, human rights defenders, journalists, politicians, and other targets of the extremist Hutu forces. Ten members of the Belgian peacekeeping troops, who were attempting to protect Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana, were killed, along with the Prime Minister. As previously mentioned, this blatant attack prompted Belgium to withdraw all of its forces from the country.

Unable to formulate the consensus for expanding the UNAMIR presence in Kigali, the UN Security Council voted to reduce the UNAMIR force from 2,486 down to 270 on April 21, 1994. Within hours of the decision taken by the Security Council in New York, the scale of the killings began to expand. The failure of the UN Security Council to provide moral leadership during the month of April certainly led to the unnecessary deaths of hundreds of thousands who could have been saved had additional troops been sent to protect those clustered in stadiums, churches, hospitals and schools.

THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU)

It is in the mutual interest of all African nations to work toward peace and stability in the region, and the efforts of the OAU to broker a cease-fire between the Rwandan government and the RPF were foundational to the eventual establishment of the Arusha Accords. In particular, the Tanzanian government worked to forge a peace process from 1991 to 1993, and hosted several key conferences leading to a temporary cease-fire.

The OAU contributed a group of fifty military observers known as the Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) to monitor the cease-fire of 1991. NMOG was deployed in the fall of that year and was later incorporated in to the UNAMIR mission.

The OAU continued to focus on seeking a political agreement between the government of President Habyarimana and the RPF, but to no avail. The Human Rights arm of the OAU, the African Commission for Human and Peoples Rights, appointed a Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions in 1994 and requested him to visit Rwanda urgently. Sadly, he was not given the resources to do so.⁵

The OAU reacted rapidly to the genocide of April, 1994, when Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary General of the OAU, issued a press release on April 8, 1994, containing a strong statement against the genocide. In the official OAU statement, Dr. Salim condemned "...in the strongest possible terms, these heinous acts perpetrated by some elements of the security forces..." and he "...call[ed] on all those involved to bring about an immediate halt to this carnage, to respect the sanctity of human life, and to work towards the earliest restoration of peace and social order, particularly in Kigali..."

The OAU also issued statements deploring the withdrawal of the UNAMIR forces from Kigali, and various other countries within the OAU lobbied for a reversal of the UN Security Council decision to withdraw the troops. While the OAU rejected the Secretary General of the UN's proposal for a sole African intervention, OAU members volunteered troops to participate in a larger UN force. In particular, the Ghanaians maintained their UN troops in Kigali, and the government of Ghana remained a strong voice for ending the massacres through the OAU.

Failure of the International Human Rights Movement

The human rights movement plays a unique role in a crisis like the Rwandan genocide. It acts as the early warning mechanism, calling for preventive strategy; documents the human rights violations as they emerge into a pattern of genocidal acts; mobilizes international shame to pressure governments and international organizations to respond; and, in the aftermath of the violence, helps establish a culture of accountability to ensure the violence does not reoccur.

In Rwanda, the tragedy did not happen overnight and the warning signs were clear well before the plane crash which killed both the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi on April 6, 1994. Non-governmental organizations were in the field, and both Rwandan and international counterparts were working in tandem to monitor and document the spiraling violence throughout the countryside. In the years leading up to the genocide, particularly after 1990 when the exiled Rwanda Patriotic Front's invasion began, human rights organizations around the world had issued reports warning of an impending crisis in the country. These reports by groups like the Belgian League in Defense of Human Rights, the International Commission of Jurists, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch/Africa, documented rampant systemic human rights abuses and the impunity enjoyed by the members of the army, and the government.⁶

In 1993, a report by a special International Commission of Investigation formed by the Inter-African Union of Human Rights, the International Center of Rights of the Person and Development, the International Federation of Human Rights and Human Rights Watch/Africa reported smaller "practice genocide" events committed by the Rwandan government and called for action by the international community. No action was taken.

In the early months of 1994, Human Rights Watch/Africa issued a report detailing the influx of weapons to Rwanda, and Amnesty International issued several reports calling for persons in the army and the government to be brought to justice⁷ (see essay entitled "Supplying the Weapons"). While these reports were directed towards the Habyarimana government, appeals for action were also made to the influential governments of France, Belgium and the United States to prod the Rwandan government toward action. Appeals were also directed towards the human rights organ of the OAU (the African Commission for Human and Peoples Rights), and the UN Human Rights Commission.

In spite of their best efforts to document the crisis, to offer strategies to stop the violence, and to lobby governments to act swiftly, the human rights movement ultimately failed. Human rights organizations could not deliver a unified constituency that demanded swift, committed and effective response by their governments and international institutions. Without that constituency, governments could mouth platitudes about "lack of national interests" and the "ineffective nature of international action in situations where violent tribalism prevails." And in the aftermath of the genocide, their lack of coordination left human rights organizations fractured and at loggerheads over the strategy to deal with the humanitarian refugee crisis that followed. The lack of consensus within the human rights communities resulted in no clear pressure to demand that governments act decisively and with the best interests of the victims in mind.

Human rights organizations must also study the lessons learned from Rwanda. They must convey to their grassroots supporters the following messages: "We are the early warning calls, amplifying the voices of the victims of genocidal acts!" "We are the only force that will compel our governments and international institutions to see that preventing genocide is in our interests", and "It is our community's moral imperative to remain vigilant over human rights crises around the world, irrespective of distance or boundaries."

The Role of the Media

In the present era, the media are beginning to assume a much greater role in human rights and humanitarian crises than in the past. This has also brought increased responsibility. Due to the very nature of communications today, news can be beamed to any part of the world via satellite and also to those who shape international policy. Governments of influential countries like the United States and member states of the United Nations have increasingly been affected by news broadcasts. The international media have a great deal of influence in shaping the opinions and perceptions of governments and the actions they take. The genocide in Rwanda was no different.

At the beginning of the killing, the violence was usually described as mindless, tribal violence, creating an impression of endemic hatred, not worthy of response. Even as the scope of the killing began to emerge in graphic TV or radio coverage, analysis did not move beyond simplistic tribal warfare explanations, undermining possible public pressure to respond to genocide. At the same time, given the limited coverage allocated to Africa, news of the historic first non-racial elections in South Africa soon pushed Rwanda out of the headlines.

In July and August of 1994, the cameras were aimed at the mass Hutu refugee exodus, and American and European viewers mobilized to send in far more aid than could be processed at the Goma airport. But months before, the estimated one million Tutsi were murdered in one of the swiftest genocides recorded in history. Where were the journalists on hand to record this brutal holocaust? The “real-time” camera images were lacking during the crucial stages of the genocide, despite a plethora of early warning signs. Like the rest of the international community, the various media failed to use their influence in the early stages of the crisis to mitigate the full-scale genocide and subsequent humanitarian catastrophe.

What can we do?

Our complicity in massive human rights violations, atrocities, and genocide results in a terrible price. The cycle of violence remains unbroken as long as the international community fails to intervene. With each turn the scale of destruction becomes greater and the violence more intense. Beyond the moral cost of our complicity, the cycle of violence results in the massive displacement of people in flight. It seems that we are only moved to respond to the image of a hungry child in the arms of a desperate mother seated in the misery of a refugee encampment. Why do we not step in before these desperate circumstances are reached?

The Rwandan genocide could have and should have been prevented had all of these components of international community acted decisively, forcefully and in a coordinated manner. These institutions however only work when individuals make them work, when we hold governments, armies, and politicians accountable for their actions or inaction. Only through our constant vigilance, will they begin to know we care and respond to our calls for action. We must use *our will* to generate the *political will* to intervene before the cycles of violence building up over time plunge countries into chaos. Only by exposing, challenging and seeking to stop abuses of fundamental human rights will we build the essential preventive bulwark which is the best defense against genocide. The choice is ours, and the work is up to us.

Discussion Questions

1. Discuss how you and your peers responded to the news of the Rwandan genocide. Was there a reaction of outrage in your community or campus? What factors contributed to the lack of citizen action to halt the genocide? What can be done differently in the future?
2. What is the difference between a peace-keeping or a peace-making mission? What kind of force would be needed to stop genocide? What would be a legitimate application of military force—to protect citizens in churches and stadiums? To disarm militias? Is military intervention ever ethical in the face of severe human rights violations?
3. Who in the international community is most accountable for the failure to respond to the genocide in Rwanda? The US Government or other governments? The United Nations Security Council? Human rights organizations?

¹ As signatories to the Genocide Convention, governments are committed to respond by 1) acting to prevent it; 2) stopping it if it is progress; and 3) punishing those responsible for it after it has been stopped.

² UNAMIR was deployed to Rwanda on 1 November, 1993, as part of the Arusha Peace Accords


³ The Arusha Peace Accords, taking place in Arusha, Tanzania, were negotiated between the Government of Rwanda, the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), and other entities. The accords were signed in August, 1993, and called for an end to the war that began in October, 1990.

⁴ UNAMIR was sent to Rwanda with a Chapter 6 mandate from the United Nations, meaning the purpose was to monitor a peace-keeping operation that was already in effect. The mandate to use deadly force was limited to self-defense and the protection of UN installations. A Chapter 7 mandate give Security Council authorization to use deadly force to establish law and order and impose peace in a conflict zone.

⁵ Amnesty International, "Rwanda: Crying out for Justice", April 6, 1995, Amnesty Field Report, 47/05/95, p. 11.

⁶ Amnesty International, "Persecution of Tutsi Minority and Repression of Government Critics, 1990-1992," Amnesty Field Report, 47/02/92.

⁷ Human Rights Watch Arms Project, "Arming Rwanda", Volume 6, Issue 1, January 1994.





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DATE: 11 JANUARY 1994

TO: DARIL\DPKO\UNATIONS NEW YORK	FROM: DALLAS\UNAMIR\KIGALI
FAX NO: MOST IMMEDIATE-CODE CABLE-212-263-9852 INMARSAT:	FAX NO: 011-230-84273
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR PROTECTION FOR INFORMANT	
ATTN: MGEN BARIL	ROOM NO. 2052
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS ONE: 1	

1. FORCE COMMANDER PUT IN CONTACT WITH INFORMANT BY VERY VERY IMPORTANT GOVERNMENT POLITICIAN. INFORMANT IS A TOP LEVEL TRAINER IN THE CADRE OF INTERHAMWE-ARMED MILITIA OF MRND.

2. HE INFORMED US HE WAS IN CHARGE OF LAST SATURDAYS DEMONSTRATIONS WHICH AIMS WERE TO TARGET DEPUTIES OF OPPOSITION PARTIES COMING TO CEREMONIES AND BELGIAN SOLDIERS. THEY HOPED TO PROVOKE THE RPF BN TO ENGAGE (BEING FIRED UPON) THE DEMONSTRATORS AND PROVOKE A CIVIL WAR. DEPUTIES WERE TO BE ASSASSINATED UPON ENTRY OR EXIT FROM PARLIAMENT. BELGIAN TROOPS WERE TO BE PROVOKED AND IF BELGIANS SOLDIERS RESORTED TO FORCE A NUMBER OF THEM WERE TO BE KILLED AND THUS GUARANTEE BELGIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM RWANDA.

3. INFORMANT CONFIRMED 48 RGF PARA CDO AND A FEW MEMBERS OF THE GENDARMERIE PARTICIPATED IN DEMONSTRATIONS IN PLAIN CLOTHES. ALSO AT LEAST ONE MINISTER OF THE MRND AND THE SOUS-PREFECT OF KIGALI WERE IN THE DEMONSTRATION. RGF AND INTERHAMWE PROVIDED RADIO COMMUNICATIONS.

4. INFORMANT IS A FORMER SECURITY MEMBER OF THE PRESIDENT. HE ALSO STATED HE IS PAID \$150,000 PER MONTH BY THE MRND PARTY TO TRAIN INTERHAMWE. DIRECT LINK IS TO CHIEF OF STAFF RGF AND PRESIDENT OF THE MRND FOR FINANCIAL AND MATERIAL SUPPORT.

5. INTERHAMWE HAS TRAINED 1700 MEN IN RGF MILITARY CAMPS OUTSIDE THE CAPITAL. THE 1700 ARE SCATTERED IN GROUPS OF 40 THROUGHOUT KIGALI. SINCE UNAMIR DEPLOYED HE HAS TRAINED 300 PERSONNEL IN THREE WEEK TRAINING SESSIONS AT RGF CAMPS. TRAINING

FOCUS WAS DISCIPLINE, WEAPONS, EXPLOSIVES, CLOSE COMBAT AND TACTICS.

6. PRINCIPAL AIM OF INTERHAMWE IN THE PAST WAS TO PROTECT KIGALI FROM RPF. SINCE UNAMIR MANDATE HE HAS BEEN ORDERED TO REGISTER ALL TUTSI IN KIGALI. HE SUSPECTS IT IS FOR THEIR EXTERMINATION. EXAMPLE HE GAVE WAS THAT IN 20 MINUTES HIS PERSONNEL COULD KILL UP TO 1000 TUTSIS.

7. INFORMANT STATES HE DISAGREES WITH ANTI-TUTSI EXTERMINATION. HE SUPPORTS OPPOSITION TO RPF BUT CANNOT SUPPORT KILLING OF INNOCENT PERSONS. HE ALSO STATED THAT HE BELIEVES THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT HAVE FULL CONTROL OVER ALL ELEMENTS OF HIS OLD PARTY\FACTION.

8. INFORMANT IS PREPARED TO PROVIDE LOCATION OF MAJOR WEAPONS CACHE WITH AT LEAST 135 WEAPONS. HE ALREADY HAS DISTRIBUTED 110 WEAPONS INCLUDING 35 WITH AMMUNITION AND CAN GIVE US DETAILS OF THEIR LOCATION. TYPE OF WEAPONS ARE G3 AND AK47 PROVIDED BY RGF. HE WAS READY TO GO TO THE ARMS CACHE TONIGHT-IF WE GAVE HIM THE FOLLOWING GUARANTEE. HE REQUESTS THAT HE AND HIS FAMILY (HIS WIFE AND FOUR CHILDREN) BE PLACED UNDER OUR PROTECTION.

9. IT IS OUR INTENTION TO TAKE ACTION WITHIN THE NEXT 36 HOURS WITH A POSSIBLE HOUR OF WEDNESDAY AT DAWN (LOCAL). INFORMANT STATES THAT HOSTILITIES MAY COMMENCE AGAIN IF POLITICAL DEADLOCK ENDS. VIOLENCE COULD TAKE PLACE DAY OF THE CEREMONIES OR THE DAY AFTER. THEREFORE WEDNESDAY WILL GIVE GREATEST CHANCE OF SUCCESS AND ALSO BE MOST TIMELY TO PROVIDE SIGNIFICANT INPUT TO ON-GOING POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS.

10. IT IS RECOMMENDED THE INFORMANT BE GRANTED PROTECTION AND EVACUATED OUT OF RWANDA. THIS HQ DOES NOT HAVE PREVIOUS UN EXPERIENCE IN SUCH MATTERS AND URGENTLY REQUESTS GUIDANCE. NO CONTACT HAS AS YET BEEN MADE TO ANY EMBASSY IN ORDER TO INQUIRE IF THEY ARE PREPARED TO PROTECT HIM FOR A PERIOD OF TIME BY GRANTING DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY IN THEIR EMBASSY IN KIGALI BEFORE MOVING HIM AND HIS FAMILY OUT OF THE COUNTRY.

11. FORCE COMMANDER WILL BE MEETING WITH THE VERY VERY IMPORTANT POLITICAL PERSON TOMORROW MORNING IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT THIS INDIVIDUAL IS CONSCIOUS OF ALL PARAMETERS OF HIS INVOLVEMENT. FORCE COMMANDER DOES HAVE CERTAIN RESERVATIONS ON THE SUDDENNESS OF THE CHANGE OF HEART OF THE INFORMANT TO COME CLEAN WITH THIS INFORMATION. RECCE OF ARMED CACHE AND DETAILED PLANNING OF RAID TO GO ON LATE TOMORROW. POSSIBILITY OF A TRAP NOT FULLY EXCLUDED, AS THIS MAY BE A SET-UP AGAINST THE VERY VERY IMPORTANT POLITICAL PERSON. FORCE COMMANDER TO INFORM SRSG FIRST THING IN MORNING TO ENSURE HIS SUPPORT.

13. PEUX CE QUE VEUX. ALLONS-Y.



RAPE AS A WEAPON

Women in Armed Conflict—the Horror of Rape

Rape is not an accident of war. Its widespread use in times of conflict holds special terror for women. The rapist displays power and contempt for his victims. Women cease to exist as individuals, and are reduced to symbols of entire villages or ethnic groups. Sexual violence against women in times of armed conflict or systematic persecution is clearly a violation of international human rights and humanitarian law.

In Rwanda, rape of the Tutsi and moderate Hutu women was primarily seen as part and parcel of the civil war. But in reality, the rape was an instrument of the genocide. For the estimated 250,000 to 500,000 women who fell victim to the crime of rape, the legacy of the genocide includes shame, alienation, disease, and, in many cases, the children born as a result of rape.

Historical Overview of Rape During War

Women and girls are among the most vulnerable of civilians during times of armed conflict. They are subjected to the full range of human rights violations. Among these, sexual violence is extremely common. It has, however, often "been dismissed by military or political leaders as a private crime or the behavior of a renegade soldier. Worse still, it has been accepted because it is so commonplace."¹ According to the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, "Although rape is one of the most widely used forms of violence against women and girls, it remains the least condemned war crime; throughout history, the rape of hundreds of thousands of women and children in all regions of the world has been a bitter reality."²

Rape during times of armed conflict has a long history. The Crusaders in the 12th century raped women in the name of religion. In the 15th century, the so-called conquest of the Americas saw mass rape of indigenous women. Rape was a weapon of terror used by the German army in the First World War and a weapon of revenge used by the Soviet army in the Second World War.³ During the Second World War, some 200,000 Korean women were held in sexual slavery as "comfort women" to the Japanese army.⁴ During the armed conflict in Bangladesh in 1971, it is estimated that 200,000 civilian women and girls were victims of rape committed by Pakistani soldiers.⁵ In Peru in the early to mid-1980s, rape of rural women most often indigenous by the Peru military forces was a common tactic of terror in a brutal counter-insurgency being fought against the Shining Path.⁶ And in March, 1994, The United Nations/Organization of American States International Civilian Mission in Haiti reported that women were being raped in a manner which appeared to form an integral part of the political violence conducted by armed civilians and the army of Haiti.⁷

Rape in Rwanda during the Genocide

In Rwanda, the horror started on April 7, 1994 when meetings of Interahamwe were held the day after the plane carrying the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi was shot down. These meetings were to conduct genocide. Within hours, the homes of members of the Tutsi ethnic minority were ablaze and members of Interahamwe, the police, and local government officials roamed through towns killing, maiming and raping Tutsi and moderate Hutu. Massacres spread to the whole country within days with victims surrounded in their homes, or in public buildings such as churches or hospitals where they took refuge. Women and girls were not spared. If not the target of killings, women were raped and otherwise sexually assaulted with impunity. Some begged to be killed with their families but were raped or taken into sexual slavery instead. In Kibuye, for example, on April 18, 1994, a Tutsi woman in the final stages of labor was stabbed to death by a hospital doctor who rampaged through the hospital killing the sick and injured. In other parts of the town, women who sought shelter in parish churches were raped, then pieces of wood were thrust into their vaginas, and they were left to die slowly.⁸

All investigators have acknowledged the difficulty of accurately documenting the occurrence of sexual violence during the Rwandan genocide. In its latest report on the experience of women during the Rwandan genocide, Human Rights Watch states that rape victims in Rwanda have "been reluctant to disclose publicly that they have been raped in part because they fear rejection and shame, however undeserved, for themselves and their families."⁹ In addition the difficulty is compounded by fear of retaliation since some of the perpetrators may be living close by or may at this moment be returning from refugee camps in Zaire.

The UN Special Rapporteur on Rwanda reported that "rape was the rule and its absence the exception...according to the statistics, one hundred cases of rape give rise to one pregnancy. If this principle is applied to the lowest figure (the numbers of pregnancies caused by rape are estimated to be between 2,000 and 5,000), it gives at least 250,000 to 500,000 cases of rape..."¹⁰ These horrifying statistics illustrate the dual burdens carried by the surviving Tutsi women of Rwanda, as they attempt to rebuild their lives in the aftermath of the genocide: loss of family members during the killing, as well as bearing and raising the children of their rapists.

International Prohibitions Against Rape During Conflict

Rape of women and girls in situations of armed conflict, whether civil or international, constitutes by definition a grave breach of international human rights and humanitarian law. The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 states that "Women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honor, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault" (Article 27). Note, however, that these acts of violence against women are characterized as attacks on their honor as opposed to a violent attack against their physical integrity. This wording is problematic as it fails to recognize in explicit language that rape and other forms of sexual violence are violent crimes against physical integrity. This characterization appears to diminish the seriousness of rape and contributes to its being considered "incidental" to torture (also an attack on physical integrity.)

The most explicit prohibitions against rape during conflict can be found in Common Article III of the Geneva Convention and in its accompanying Protocol II. Common Article III prohibits "violence to life and person", "cruel treatment", "torture" or "outrages upon personal dignity". Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, which also governs certain internal armed conflicts and which has been applied to Rwanda, forbids "violence to the life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular...cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation" and "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution, and any form of indecent assault." Humanitarian organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross have strengthened protection for women during armed conflict on the basis of Protocol II and Common Article III of the Geneva Convention.

Prosecution of Rape During Conflict

Despite the existence of international prohibitions against rape during armed conflict, very few instances of prosecution have taken place. The crime of rape was prosecuted for the first time during the Tokyo Tribunal, held shortly after World War II, but international courts fell silent on this issue until 1991, when reports of the widespread and systematic use of rape as a tactic of war in former Yugoslavia provoked international condemnation. This outcry ultimately led to explicit identification of rape as a war crime by the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia and, significantly, to the decision to prosecute rape as a war crime.

In 1994, the UN Security Council expanded the mandate of the International Criminal Tribunal to include violations of the laws of war during the 1994 internal conflict in Rwanda. The International Criminal Tribunal on Rwanda is empowered explicitly to prosecute persons who committed genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of Common Article III of the Geneva Conventions. Rape is thus a prosecutable crime under this mandate.

Although the Rwanda Tribunal has indicted at least 21 people for war crimes by 1997, none of the indictments is for the crime of rape. It is imperative that such indictments are brought and cases are prosecuted, so that African women will begin to achieve the same measure of justice afforded to the women of Bosnia, and the justice they deserve.

Responses to Rape—What Has Been Done?

The decisions to identify rape as a prosecutable war crime in the International Tribunal for former Yugoslavia and to extend this definition of indictable war crimes to the Rwanda Tribunal show that the widespread and intensive lobbying by non-governmental women's and human rights organizations (including Amnesty International, USA) on their governments and on the United Nations was an effective action technique. This effort was stimulated and aided by newspaper articles and TV news reports on the use of rape as a technique of ethnic cleansing in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, raising consciousness of the issue and a sense of outrage among men and women around the world. The lobbying included individual and multi-organizational letter-writing and meetings with Congressional members and with members of the Clinton Administration,

holding events and publishing articles, giving TV interviews to ensure that the public was kept informed and encouraged to join in this lobbying effort.

At the international level, the global women's movement mounted a campaign calling on the 1993 UN Vienna Conference on Human Rights to recognize that women's rights are an integral part of international human rights. Public human rights education combined with lobbying led to the inclusion of language in the Vienna Declaration on the need to end violence against women and, in particular, in armed conflicts. The effort continued into the UN Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in September, 1995, whose Platform for Action also included commitments by governments "to take action to investigate and punish members of the police, security and armed forces who perpetrate acts of violence against women, violations of international humanitarian law and violations of the human rights of women in situations of armed conflict."¹¹

The Rwanda Tribunal—Need for Reform

In 1996, as it became clear that the International Tribunal for Rwanda had not brought any indictments for rape as a war crime, a group of human rights organizations (including Amnesty International, USA) wrote to the Chief Prosecutors of the Tribunal, both outgoing (Judge Goldstone) and incoming (Judge Louise Arbour) and Amnesty International USA mounted a membership action addressing this concern.

In order to move the issue of women's rights and justice for the crime of rape to the forefront of the Tribunal's mandate, the human rights community must demand that these crimes be investigated, documented, and prosecuted. In addition, the international community must provide financial and technical support for administration of justice to both the Rwandan Tribunal and the Government of Rwanda as they attempt to prosecute these war crimes. The human rights movement must continue to monitor the progress of the Rwanda Tribunal with respect to obtaining justice for the women of Rwanda, and to ensure that their voices will be heard.

Discussion Questions

1. Discuss the consequences of the way that women's human rights violations are viewed—are women even seen as the victims? Are the violations seen as equal as other attacks on the physical integrity of a person?
2. In our own society, rape is relegated to the private domain of accountability—the individual perpetrator is responsible for the violence. Social and political conditions are seldom evoked as contributing to a climate where the violence is allowed to occur. Are there parallels with rape in war, where violence against women is accepted as somehow part of the "booty" or the "spoils of war?"
3. Devise a strategy for raising consciousness in your community about rape in war as a human rights violation. Who are your allies, how would you frame the issue, and what would you call upon your community to do?

¹ Human Rights Watch Africa/Human Rights Watch Women's Project/Federation Internationale Des Ligues Des Droits de L'Homme, "Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence During the Rwandan Genocide and its Aftermath", pp. 27-28.

² Preliminary Report submitted to the UN Human Rights Commission by Radhika Coomaraswamy, Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, E/CN.4/1995/42, p.64.

³ Amnesty International, "It's About Time: Human Rights Are Women's Right", 1995, p. 18.

⁴ Preliminary Report submitted to the UN Human Rights Commission by Radhika Coomaraswamy, Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, E/CN.4/1995/42, p. 66.

⁵ Ibid., p. 65.

⁶ Amnesty International, "Caught Between Two Fires: Amnesty International Peru Briefing", 1989, pp. 10-11.


⁷ Op.Cit., Preliminary Report submitted to the UN Human Rights Commission, p. 65.

⁸ Op.Cit., "It's About Time: Human Rights are Women's Right", p. 17.

⁹ Op.Cit., "Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence During the Rwandan Genocide and its Aftermath".

¹⁰ United Nations, "Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda", by Mr. Rene Degni-Segui, Special Rapporteur of the Commission of Human Rights, E/CN.4/1996/68, January 29, 1996.

¹¹ United Nations, "Beijing Platform for Action", UNDPI/1766Wom-95-39642, February, 1996.





THE REFUGEE CRISIS

Introduction

A tragic consequence of the genocide in Rwanda was the flight of close to two million people from Rwanda and Burundi, constituting one of the worst refugee crises in recorded history. This case dramatically illustrates the link between human rights violations and resultant mass population displacements that have occurred not only in the Great Lakes region of Africa, but in numerous other countries such as the former Yugoslavia, the former Soviet Union, and Central America.

Evolution of Refugee Rights

The formal protection of refugees came about in the modern era in the aftermath of World War I and World War II. The massive population displacements as a result of these two conflicts provided the impetus for the United Nations to create legislation addressing basic human rights. In tandem with the principles within the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the rights of refugees were codified in the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1951. This Convention specifically protects the fundamental rights of refugees and provides the underlying basis of the system of international refugee law.

Foundational to the protection of refugees is the principle of “*non-refoulement*,” or, the prohibition of forced return. Article 33 of the Refugee Convention states “...no Contracting State shall expel or return (“*refouler*”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” This basic right is reiterated by the 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa.

Thus, the forced return of persons to any country where they are at risk of serious human rights violations is a breach of international law, and the states bordering on Rwanda and Burundi are required to follow this principle as signatories of the 1951 UN Convention and the 1969 OAU Convention. The decision to return to a country of origin is to be made by the individual refugee, free from pressure of any kind and on the basis of objective information about conditions in the country of origin. In addition, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 13, spells out the right of each person to return to his or her own country, and by extension, the governments of

Portions of this essay draw upon material found in “The Return Home: Rumours and Realities,” published by Amnesty International, February, 1996, AFR 02/01/96.

countries where people have been forced to flee their homes should take all necessary steps to create conditions for refugee repatriation. Until safe conditions are established in the country of origin, refugees will need the protection of host countries and the international community.

In addition to assisting refugees who have crossed an international boundary, the international community has begun to focus attention on the internally displaced populations, or IDP's, who remain within their country of origin. Often, these IDP's are the most vulnerable to human rights abuses, since they do not fall under the protection mandate of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). More recently, efforts have begun to address the needs of this group, but the numbers of IDP's are rising steadily with each communal and intra-state conflict.

Mass Exodus from Rwanda

In July, 1994, approximately 1.7 million Rwandans, predominantly Hutu, poured from the country in an overwhelming flood. Estimates by the UNHCR placed the rate of exodus at 15,000 per hour, and in one week's time, more than a million people had crossed the border from Rwanda to Zaire. The crowd of refugees was a mixture of orphans, priests and nuns, farmers, civil servants, government officials, and Hutu extremist militia, who herded the people across the border, telling all who remained that they would be murdered by the "cockroach Tutsi" RPF forces.

The French launched Operation Turquoise to provide a "safe haven" for refugees in the southwest portion of the country, and drew hundreds of thousands of Hutu towards the southwest portion of Rwanda and over the borders to Zaire and Burundi. The majority of refugees (numbering one million) settled near Goma, and Bukavu, Zaire, along the shores of Lake Kivu (see Map 1). Other refugees, numbering some 300,000, fled to Tanzania. The conditions in the Goma camps was particularly abysmal, and in the end of July, 1994, a cholera epidemic began, claiming up to 6,000 deaths per day. Ironically, the graphic television images focusing on the horror of the Goma epidemic helped the international community temporarily forget that between 800,000 and one million people had just been exterminated a few months earlier.

The situation in the refugee camps stabilized by early 1995, with a semblance of order and basic food and water being provided through the UNHCR, the UN World Food Program, and their non-governmental organization implementing partners. But despite the stabilization of the political situation in Rwanda under the Rwandan Patriotic Front and the swearing in of the new government in Kigali during July, 1994, the eventual repatriation of the refugees was to be delayed not by months, but by almost two years.

Rwandans in Exile—The Risks of Return

With the containment of the cholera epidemic in the Goma camps and the stabilization of the situation in Kigali, hope arose within the international community and the UNHCR for the repatriation of the refugees. The various agencies coping with the refugee disaster witnessed a return of approximately 140,000 from the Zaire camps during the month of August, 1994. But the tide of returnees began to slow to a trickle during the month of September, 1994, and thereafter ceased

almost entirely. The reluctance by refugees to return emanated from two primary sources: first, the dubious security conditions within Rwanda facing those who might return, and second, from the political sway held by the Interahamwe and ex-Rwandan government forces over the refugees within the camps in exile.

CONDITIONS IN RWANDA

Arbitrary Arrest and Detention

As depicted in the film, *Forsaken Cries*, the number of arbitrary detentions and arrest within Rwanda increased sharply during 1995 and 1996. By December of 1995, over 60,000 people were held without charge or trial on accusations of having participated in the genocide, and by 1997, inmate estimates reached as high as 90,000. The conditions in these prisons are horrendous, with gross overcrowding, no sanitary facilities, and inhuman and degrading treatment. A visit by Amnesty International delegates to the Gitarama prison in June, 1995, revealed conditions that could be described as "torture."¹

Despite the recognition on the part of the new Rwandan government that many of the detainees may be innocent, there has been little progress in alleviating the conditions or in stopping the practice of arbitrary arrest and detention. News of this type of treatment has reached the refugees, and contributed to their fear of return.

Political Killings and "Disappearances"

During 1995 and 1996 there were also numerous documented reports of massacres of civilians by RPA forces throughout Rwanda. The victims came from many different sectors of society, but were usually Hutu, and were individuals known to have expressed criticism of the army or the government. They also have occurred while legal owners of homes may have been trying to repossess their property upon return from exile. In particular, some human rights defenders have been targeted for intimidation due to their continued monitoring of the situation within Rwanda under the new government.

In addition to massacres of civilians by army forces, the situation for returnees was fraught with danger due to personal vengeance campaigns waged by survivors of the genocide. In a rural prefecture outside Kigali, a woman and her four children who dared to return from Zaire were attacked by a group of four men. The mother and three of her children were killed, and the attackers were described as survivors of the genocide acting in revenge for crimes allegedly committed by the woman's husband. Though several of the attackers were arrested, it is uncertain whether they are still in custody or whether a trial for them will ever be scheduled given the emphasis on achieving justice for the victims of the original April genocide.

Despite all the uncertain conditions in Rwanda, the new RPA government in Kigali made efforts to encourage the return of the refugees, stressing they were welcome in Rwanda. Concrete measures were taken to form reception committees that received and resettled refugees. A Ministry of Rehabilitation was created to allocate land to returnees who could not reclaim land or their own homes, and assisted in the building of homes and distribution of construction and farming tools.

Faced with very little funding and lack of personnel, the new Rwandan government is still struggling to rebuild society after the genocide and destruction of the country's infrastructure. Yet, despite verbal assurances and some government efforts at reintegration, the atmosphere in Rwanda remains a complex mix of hope, fear, peace, and uncertainty.

POLITICAL STRANGLEHOLD IN THE CAMPS

The vast majority of the refugees in exile yearn for a peaceable return to life in Rwanda. But coupled with their fear of conditions within Rwanda, is the fear associated with reprisal by the refugee camp leadership, a leadership that uses covert and overt intimidation, beatings, and even killing to prevent the refugees from going home.

The hierarchical structure of Rwandan society (see essay entitled "History of Rwanda") was replicated in the refugee camps in Zaire, Burundi, and, to a lesser extent, in Tanzania. Local authority structures from Rwanda were reproduced in the camps, thereby enabling prefecture and commune leaders to retain tight control over the population. Interspersed with the prefecture and commune leaders were members of the militia and Interahamwe, virtually indistinguishable from the rest of the refugee population.

Using the refugee camps as their base, members of the former Rwandan government and the Interahamwe began tightening their grip of control on the refugee population in August, 1994, and employed propaganda and threats to prevent the refugees from returning voluntarily. Preventing voluntary return aids the Rwandan government in exile in three main ways: first, it prevents refugees who could identify those responsible for genocide and assist the new government of Rwanda and the International Tribunal in prosecuting the perpetrators of the genocide; second, preventing large numbers of refugees from returning to Rwanda deprives the new government of legitimacy in the eyes of the international community, and keeps the focus on conditions in Rwanda, rather than pursuing justice for the architects of the April genocide; and third, the presence of refugees enables the camp leaders to siphon off large amounts of food aid to supply the militias, FAR, and the Interahamwe with needed food and money to continue their campaign from exile.

The conditions in the refugee camps became so corrupt and the stranglehold of the former Rwandan government so tight, that a group of fifteen international relief agencies signed a **communiqué on November 3, 1994**, demanding that the international community (particularly the UN Security Council) authorize the UNHCR with the ability to separate the camp intimidators from the refugees, remove arms from the camps, and set up a bona fide process for repatriation of refugees. With no response forthcoming, several of the non-governmental organizations, notably Medecins sans Frontieres (Doctors without Borders) and the International Rescue Committee (IRC) ended their operations in the camps of Zaire.

Refoulement from Zaire, Tanzania, and Burundi

At the same time the camp authorities were trying to prevent the return of refugees, the Zairian army actually attempted to force 13,000 Rwandese refugees and 2,000 Burundian refugees back to their country of origin. These were flagrant and dramatic violations of refugee rights and international law. The result of this action by the Zairian army was to propel around 170,000

refugees from nearby camps into the Zairian countryside in an effort to avoid *refoulement* to Rwanda. The Zairian government stopped the *refoulement* after five days due to the outcry of the international community, but the damage had been done—many families had been separated as a result of the chaos, and many had been beaten and robbed. Zaire continued to threaten a *refoulement* campaigns if the refugees did not voluntarily return to Rwanda by the end of December, 1995.

In like manner, the Tanzanian government closed its borders to refugees from Rwanda on March 31, 1995. And the Tanzanian government forcefully *refouled* an estimated 20,000 refugees by May, 1995. Following Zaire's example, the Tanzanian government threatened further *refoulement* if the UNHCR did not step up its repatriation activities to entice Rwandans to return home. The government of Burundi has also forcibly repatriated several hundred refugees throughout 1995.

The above actions are the eventual result of a sudden and massive influx of refugees, usually resulting in a huge burden on host governments that are already facing difficulties within their own borders. Zaire and Tanzania both had grave economic problems before the refugee onslaught, and Burundi was in a state of virtual civil war. Environmental devastation has resulted in the areas surrounding the refugee camps, with forests and soil being depleted as the refugees cut down trees for firewood. In addition, the influx of refugees has affected the wage level of the areas near the camps, since many of the refugees sell their labor at lower prices than workers in the host country. Additional reasons cited by Zaire, Tanzania and Burundi for expelling the refugees center upon internal security issues. All three countries were aware that the former government of Rwanda, the former army of Rwanda, and the associated militia were operating on their territory, and possessed weaponry that could be used for a variety of purposes.


The international community failed to give enough support to the host countries of the regions for the sustained aid required for high numbers of refugees. Although the forceable repatriation of refugees by all three countries of asylum is to be deplored, greater sensitivity to the very real concerns of the host countries might have prevented some of the worst cases of *refoulement* from occurring.

Discussion Questions

1. Discuss the relationship between accountability and repatriation.
2. As activists, how do we link humanitarian assistance and human rights concerns? Why is it important to make sure governments do not break that link? How do we make the case to our governments that human rights violations are the early warning signs of humanitarian disasters?
3. Do you think the three non-governmental organizations made the right decision to withdraw their operations from the refugee camps? Why or why not?
4. Debate why governments feel compelled to *refoule* when it is a clear violation of international humanitarian and human rights law to do so.

¹ See Amnesty International Urgent Action "Rwanda: Fear of Further Deaths in Custody," 9 June, 1995, AI Index AFR 47/14/95.

Map 1: Refugee Movements



RELIEF AGENCIES DEMAND ACTION

3 November 1994 - We, the undersigned international humanitarian organizations working or supporting operations in the refugee camps in Goma, Zaire declare that the current relief operations are untenable. Living and working conditions for refugees and aid workers in the camps are becoming unacceptably dangerous.

We strongly support the October 21st statement by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees regarding deteriorating security conditions in the camps. Furthermore:

- 1) Under present conditions, the UNHCR is prevented from fulfilling its mandate of protecting and assisting refugees.
- 2) The work of humanitarian organizations is largely compromised due to the current power structure within the camps. When aid workers attempt to intervene on behalf of the victims of discriminatory practices, their lives are threatened.
- 3) The relief operation is unsustainable. Refugees are denied the right to return to their homes, equal access to humanitarian aid, protection, and the guarantee of basic human rights. They remain hostages.

The undersigned humanitarian organizations assert that in order to provide equitable assistance and protection, the following conditions must be met:

- 1) Those structures within the camps which incite violence against refugees and disrupt the delivery of humanitarian aid must be separated from the main body of refugees.
- 2) All arms must be removed from the camps.
- 3) Security must be established so that an official and independent registration may be carried out.
- 4) Protection of refugees must be fully guaranteed; refugees must be free to stay or return to their homes without intimidation or fear for their lives.
- 5) Relief agencies must be permitted to deliver humanitarian assistance without hinderance from the current power structure within the camps.

Aid workers are increasingly outraged that they are becoming unwilling accomplices. Unless there is an immediate and tangible effort to bring about positive change in the camps, the undersigned international agencies may be forced to withdraw their assistance from the camps. We insist that the United Nations and international community take immediate and decisive action.



SUPPLYING THE WEAPONS: ARMS FLOWS TO THE GREAT LAKES REGION

Tools of Abuse: The Problem of Arms Flows in the Context of Genocide

The genocide and bloodshed in the Great Lakes region illustrate the failure by the international community to curb weapons flows to armed factions which commit gross and widespread human rights violations. These events also illustrate the proliferation of human rights abuses and crimes against humanity associated with armed conflict and civil strife around the world where civilians, mostly women and children, are often the unfortunate victims. One response to this trend is to campaign against the transfer of arms and military equipment, security, or police equipment, technology, and training from one country to another where it is demonstrated that those transfers contribute to human rights abuses. This essay discusses the historical patterns of arms flows, as well as the role of arms supply in the context of the Rwanda genocide.

From Colonial Domination to "Security Assistance"—Arms as Tools of Control

Colonial expansion across the globe required the use of superior weaponry to coerce conquered populations into submission. From the conquest of the Americas by the Spanish and Portuguese, to the domination of Asia by the British and French, and even into the 20th century as Europe "scrambled for Africa," the tools of coercion were an integral part of the conquest. Armed with superior weaponry such as rifles, cannons, and grenades, the colonial powers could intimidate and eventually subdue whole communities of people throughout the conquered territories.

But the end of the colonial era in the 1950's was not an end to the mass use of weapons as tools of coercion. The global Cold War had only just begun, and with much of the world aligning behind either the United States or the Soviet Union, the race began for "clients" that could be enticed with attractive foreign aid and weaponry. From the 1950's until the end of the 1980's, many of the developing countries of the world relied on either the Soviet Union or the United States of America and its NATO allies for transfers of weapons, military training and advisory services, and money to finance their ever growing armies, intelligence services, and paramilitary militias. As proxies for the superpowers, many of the post-colonial governments in Africa, Asia and Latin America lacked legitimacy, and rule by coercion was inevitable.

The post-Cold War era (1988 to present) witnessed a downward trend in both overall military expenditures and in arms transfers. But most of this decrease was accounted for by the sharp declines in the Soviet Union/Russian/Eastern European markets. According to an annual survey by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, sub-Saharan Africa's arms imports declined from 1988 to 1992, but has since then has begun to increase.¹ Between 1992 and 1994, the three countries importing the most weapons in sub-Saharan Africa were Angola (total cumulative value of imports, \$865 million), Nigeria (total cumulative value of imports, \$165 million), and Rwanda (total cumulative value of imports \$100 million).²

Weapons transfer is integral to the ability of many states to address internal uprisings and domestic challenges in the post-Cold War era. Weapons are increasingly used within communal conflict situations, by paramilitary groups or armies against civilian populations who happen to be of the wrong ethnic, racial, religious, or political group. And ultimately, those who suffer the most end up being the most vulnerable—women, children, and the elderly. Under the guise of “security assistance,” many countries, including the United States, provide the weaponry and training to those who torture, massacre, and, in the worst case, plan and commit genocide.

Weapons supplied to armies and militias consist of either heavy weaponry (tanks, aircraft, naval equipment, missiles) or light weaponry (grenades, landmines, automatic rifles). The most difficult items to track and control are the light weapons, and it is these arms that account for as much as 90 percent of the casualties in many armed conflicts.³ In particular, the light weaponry are the weapons of choice for paramilitary militias that inflict human rights abuse on civilians.

Suppliers and their Motives

The modern day suppliers of heavy and light weaponry include, but are not limited to, China, Russia, the United States, Egypt, Great Britain, France, Germany, Israel, South Africa, Pakistan, and India. Increasingly, the suppliers of light weaponry include transnational companies that, as the name implies, transcend national boundaries in terms of their manufacturing and operating capacities. These transnational companies are often able to deliver weapons to countries normally under United Nations arms embargoes by shipping to third countries under fictitious order forms and then smuggling the arms into the embargoed country.

Strategic and economic reasons have been the primary motives for countries to supply arms. For example, in order to maintain historical prestige in Africa and throughout the world, France supports countries where the French language is predominantly spoken, such as the Ivory Coast, Senegal, Gabon, and Rwanda under the Hutu Habyarimana regime. Countries such as China and the former Yugoslavia, however, export their arms chiefly because they have a shortage of cash and a surplus of weapons. The desire for influence, prestige, and the need for income all combine to impel countries and transnational companies to export their arms to pariah states and to demonstrated abusers of human rights.

Arms Flows to the Great Lakes Region

The international community was clearly warned of the dangers in the Great Lakes region of Africa before the mass killings began in Rwanda. In the neighboring country of Burundi, at least 50,000 people had been killed in politically motivated ethnic killings since 1993, and the UN Special Rapporteur had forecast an impending disaster in Rwanda if actions were not taken to prevent it. Yet despite these warnings and various international agreements to prevent arms flows into the Great Lakes region, the steady stream of weapons and ammunition was not stopped. International suppliers shipped arms and provided training to both the Government of Rwanda, and to the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) forces in exile during the years prior to the outbreak of the war and the genocide.

Arming the Rwandan Government

The key supplier of arms to the Hutu Habyarimana government was France. France's motivation for continuing to arm and train the Habyarimana regime centered upon ties of loyalty, concern for preserving francophone Africa, and for maintaining their power and influence in the eyes of other francophone states in Africa. To demonstrate their support of the Habyarimana regime, the French supplied a variety of mortars, artillery guns, spare parts, training, and technical assistance for armored vehicles, cannons, and machine guns."⁴

South Africa was also a supplier of arms to the Rwandan government prior to the genocide. According to a Human Rights Watch Arms Project report, light arms, machine guns, and ammunition were supplied prior to the genocide. Grenades and grenade launchers were also shipped from South Africa, including deadly fragmentation grenades. The South African Arms Corporation (Armscor), shipped these weapons to Goma, Zaire, via the Seychelles Islands in an effort to avoid detection by international arms monitors.

Egypt provided arms and weapons to Rwanda as well. Beginning in 1992, Egyptian arms dealers negotiated one of the largest deals with the Rwandan government, to eventually provide over six million dollars worth of arms to Rwanda. The French government's bank, the Credit Lyonnais, made a guarantee for this loan to the Rwandan government, who in turn purchased the arms from Egypt.⁵ This contract provided long-range artillery guns, mortars, artillery shells, grenades, landmines, plastic explosives, and Egyptian manufactured Kalashnikov automatic rifles to the Rwandan government, in return for cash payments and transfers of tea crops to Egypt.

Arming the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)

On the other side of the conflict, Uganda served as the most important military ally of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and supplied these rebel forces with both a military base to launch their incursions, as well as the training and weaponry to do so. Leaders of Uganda's National Resistance Army (NRA) claimed that thousands of deserters joined the RPF, taking weapons and uniforms along with them. The Ugandan President, Yoweri Museveni, denied that any official support was provided by the NRA. However, information uncovered by the Human Rights Watch Arms Project indicates that military, material, and financial support from the Tutsi diaspora were

funneled through Kampala, Uganda, to RPF forces between 1990 and 1993, during the ongoing civil war in neighboring Rwanda. Uganda was thus used as a base for the Tutsi re-entry into Rwanda.⁶

Use of Weaponry During the Genocide

While many of the mass killings of the civilian population were carried out with farming implements (machetes, hoes, knives), the slaughter was initiated and supervised by members of the Rwandan security forces who had more sophisticated light weaponry. As indicated in the film, *Forsaken Cries*, light arms were distributed to the militias during the two years preceding the genocide. During the genocide, the perpetrators often used grenades to kill groups of Tutsi clustered in churches and stadiums, finishing off any survivors with automatic rifles and machetes. Many Tutsi paid their killers to end their lives with bullets fired from imported weaponry, rather than be killed by machetes. Landmines were also used to destroy the fields of the Tutsi people and to make them impossible to cultivate for years. Other light weapons such as grenade launchers and mortars were used to shell homes and buildings belonging to Tutsi.

Arms Flows In the Aftermath of the Genocide

When the perpetrators of the genocide fled the country in fear of retribution, many carried their weapons with them into neighboring Zaire. Despite an international arms embargo, these exiled forces continued to obtain arms and ammunition. In June, 1995, Amnesty International issued a report covering the arms and ammunition flowing through Goma in Eastern Zaire, and required urgent action by the international community. Amnesty International warned that if arms supplies continued to reach the forces under the command of the former Hutu army and militias who planned and organized the genocide, there was a danger that large scale human rights abuses might continue. Amnesty International and other human rights and non-governmental organizations prodded the UN to establish a Commission of Inquiry in late 1995 to investigate breaches of the May 1994 arms embargo.

While the former Rwandan government forces and militias regrouped and rearmed themselves outside Rwanda from within the refugee camps, they began to launch cross-border attacks on Rwanda, which included deliberate and arbitrary killings of unarmed civilians, murders of political opponents, and targeted assassinations of genocide survivors. The purpose of these murders was to destabilize Rwanda from within, making it unsafe for the return of the refugees, as well as to eliminate any eyewitnesses to the genocide who might eventually testify against the FAR and militias.

United Nations Efforts to Address the Arms Flows to Rwandan Forces

The proliferation of arms in the region, particularly to those forces that organized the genocide of 1994, is recognized by governments and the international community as a significant contributing factor to human rights abuse and regional instability. The UN Security Council, the Organization of African Unity, the European Union, and governments such as the United Kingdom,

the United States, Belgium, France and Germany have all expressed grave concern about continued arms flows to the region.

A number of UN Resolutions were passed to try to stem the flow of arms into the Great Lakes region. The following is a list of resolutions governing arms flows into the region passed and adopted by the UN Security Council (see "Resources" for UN Web Site where original text of these resolutions can be viewed):

- ◆ UN Security Council Resolution 918, adopted May 17, 1994
- ◆ UN Security Council Resolution 997, adopted June 9, 1995
- ◆ UN Security Council Resolution 1013, adopted September 7, 1995
- ◆ UN Security Council Resolution 1053, adopted April 23, 1996

Sadly, these resolutions did very little to actually halt the flow of arms into the region. No sanctions or enforcement mechanisms were ever developed to fortify the Security Council resolutions. As late as December, 1996, the perpetrators of the genocide in Rwanda continued to receive arms and ammunition in eastern Zaire, while the Burundian Hutu refugees benefited from the same supplier networks and continued to use weapons during 1995 and 1996 to launch cross-border attacks against the government of Burundi.

While the United Nations may issue all the reports it wishes condemning countries that violate arms embargoes, no serious action will be taken unless enforcement mechanisms can be developed. Currently, the UN must rely on the use of international condemnation and shame to modify the actions of arms suppliers during an embargo.

Stemming the Flow of Arms—Monitoring and Enforcing Sanctions

Events in Rwanda illustrate that continued arms flows during a civil conflict can have the gravest of consequences, both for individual human rights as well as for regional stability. The continued flows also debunk the myth that when a region is awash with weapons, effective monitoring, deterrence, and enforcement efforts are not worth the costs. It appears that those who gain ground militarily and politically in African conflicts are those with the access to foreign weapons, forcing even the more moderate political actors to pursue military options in order to survive.

Civilians of war-torn regions are not the only victims of weaponry used in human rights abuses—increasingly, the humanitarian workers and human rights monitors in conflict zones are subjected to casualties from well-armed militias. The constituencies of humanitarian and human rights organizations should mobilize for action to place pressure on the governments of those nations that export arms to human rights abusers.

Legislation and regulations need to be established at both the national and international levels. These laws should prohibit transfers of arms, military equipment, police training, technology used as instruments of torture, and financial and logistical support for acquiring these items, unless it can be demonstrated that such transfers will not contribute to human rights abuse. The supplier government should take responsibility for using transfer channels that can be monitored by

independent observers. In addition, it should be incumbent upon the supplier governments to publicly disclose their arms transfers, in advance of the transaction.

The international community has not taken seriously its own efforts to control the flow of arms to the Central African region. We must encourage our governments and international institutions such as the UN to address the root causes of arms flows and keep the issues of proliferation on the political agenda. In addition, monitoring, disclosure, and enforcement of UN arms embargoes must be given greater priority by UN member states, in particular, by the UN Security Council member states. In the absence of an explicit international enforcement mechanism for UN arms embargoes, the human rights community must hold the supplier governments accountable for their arms transfers to known human rights abusers. Only by doing so, can we make progress toward stemming the flow of arms to human rights abusers.

Discussion Questions

1. During the heart of the Cold War, activists around the world challenged weapons proliferation to end the "reign of nuclear terror." But today, where communal conflicts are exploding, it is the transfer of light weaponry that poses the greatest threat to civilians. How do we hold government accountable for the transfer of these weapons? How must we shift our tactics to hold private corporations accountable for the end use of these weapons?
2. In the wake of the Cold War, many regimes that were once proxies of the superpowers have become even weaker in their ability to govern their populations. As states weaken, we see the appearance of armed groups acting as self-defense networks for their different communities. Discuss what motivates groups to arm themselves—what are the "payoffs?" What are the drawbacks with increasing militarization?
3. In the film, *Forsaken Cries*, we see young children carrying weapons and taking part in army and private militia activity. Discuss both the short and long-term ramifications are of child participation in the army and militias. How can armies and militia groups be held accountable?

¹ U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1995." Washington, DC: USACDA, 1996, pp. 1-11.

² Ibid, p. 153.

³ "Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Cambodia." United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. New York: UNIDIR, 1996.

⁴ Human Rights Watch, "Arming Rwanda: The Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses in the Rwandan War", Volume 6, Issue 1, January, 1994, p. 16.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 14-15.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 19-21.



JUSTICE FOR THE VICTIMS? THE STRUGGLE AGAINST IMPUNITY

It is individuals within a society that are responsible for ordering, carrying out, or condoning human rights violations and genocide. If these individuals escape justice for their crimes, they and others will realize they can commit these crimes again. Reversing the trend toward impunity is an absolute necessity to stem the tide of human rights abuse and to develop a human rights culture in the 21st century.

The vast majority of the architects of the Rwandan genocide currently enjoy impunity, as they reside temporarily in the nearby countries of Zaire, Tanzania, and Burundi. Other perpetrators of the genocide are safe in European countries, out of the reach of justice. After examining the historical context in which accountability for war crimes has been established, this essay discusses the mechanisms for ending impunity, explores the need for justice in Rwanda, and calls for action on the part of the international community to end impunity for the perpetrators of genocide.

Historical Attempts to End Impunity

Since the beginning of history, humanity has been plagued by the problem of impunity. Even after the successful establishment of the "rule of law" in many states, the international community continues to struggle against the commission of lawless and often senseless acts of violence. It was only in 1945 with the creation of the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and later in Tokyo that the seeds of international accountability began to take root. These trials led to the adoption of a series of principles setting out the basis upon which any individual could be held responsible for crimes committed under international law.

The Nuremberg Principles contain three groups of crimes for which individuals can be held liable. The first, called "crimes against peace," are described as the planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of a war of aggression, or some form of participation therein. Next are violations of the laws and customs of war, called "war crimes," which include such acts as murder, ill-treatment, deportation and the wanton destruction of cities. Last are "crimes against humanity," directed against any civilian population, and include murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhuman acts, as well as persecution on various grounds. Unfortunately, until very recently, these precedents have had to stand alone, in spite of the more than fifty serious armed conflicts which have occurred since the Second World War.

Finally, in 1993, the United Nations Security Council confronted the shocking accounts of “ethnic cleansing” in Bosnia by creating the first ever truly international non-military criminal tribunal, albeit only on a temporary and limited basis. This action was quickly followed by the creation in 1994 of a similar tribunal for Rwanda. The latter action has the added significance of being the first “official” recognition of the commission of the crime of genocide since the adoption of the 1948 Genocide Convention.

The Struggle Against Impunity in Rwanda

The creation of the Rwanda Tribunal appears to have been motivated both by a concern over the seriousness of the alleged crimes, and by the inability of the Rwandan criminal justice system in the wake of the civil war to effectively deal with those suspects who had fled into other countries. Recognizing their failure to prevent the genocide and to demonstrate to the new government of Rwanda their solidarity for what had happened, the international human rights community forcefully demanded accountability for the genocide.

But while the aims of the Rwanda Tribunal are noble, the creation of the Tribunal cannot possibly deal with the bulk of the alleged perpetrators who are now being held in overcrowded jails throughout Rwanda. The new government of Rwanda needs assistance from the international community to achieve the eventual reconstruction of their judicial system. Those held in prison must be given due process and fair trials. Without the help of the international community, these 90,000 suspects may languish for years in deplorable conditions, suffering as scapegoats for the organizers of the genocide and precipitating a new cycle of human rights violations.

There are, however, several respects in which the creation of the Rwanda Tribunal is contributing to the international community’s struggle against impunity:

- 1) It reaffirms the cardinal principle of the Nuremberg Trials that individuals can be prosecuted before an international criminal tribunal for committing acts prohibited under international law. This extension of international prohibitions to the conduct of individuals, whether acting in an “official” capacity or not, is an important victory against impunity.
- 2) By employing its powers under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter in this way, the UN Security Council has not only recognized the link between impunity and threats to international peace and security, but also demonstrated that it possesses the means necessary to ensure that those who commit international crimes are tried and punished. Those who would continue to doubt the seriousness of these prohibitions, have now been placed on notice—behave with impunity at your own peril!
- 3) Because of the unique circumstances in which the alleged crimes occurred in Yugoslavia, and especially in Rwanda, the creation of these Tribunals has given the international community an opportunity to affirm the exact nature and scope of its prohibitions. For example, it has now been affirmed that genocide and other crimes against humanity need not be associated with an conflict between states for them to be subject to international prosecution. Instead, crimes resulting from both civil war and inter-state conflict can be prosecuted solely on the basis that they have shocked humanity’s conscience.

Performance of the Rwanda Tribunal

In an effort to bring accountability to the perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide, the Rwandan Tribunal, based in Arusha, Tanzania, began its work in 1994. As of 1995, only eight indictments had been issued against the perpetrators of the genocide. This *ad hoc* tribunal suffered initially from a lack of cooperation from many UN member states, some of whom were actually harboring the architects of the genocide. As a result of an outcry by the human rights community, some states (Belgium, Zambia and Zaire) began arresting suspects, but many remain at large in France and other countries supportive of the former Hutu regime.

As late as 1997, the Tribunal is still plagued with fiscal and administrative difficulties, and with allegations of mismanagement and corruption. A further significant failure of the Tribunal lies in that as late as 1996, no indictments had been brought for the crime of rape during war (see essay, "Rape as a Weapon"). Member states of the UN and the human rights community must maintain vigilance over the administration of justice process to ensure that resources are available for the Tribunal to continue its mission and that the staff perform their responsibilities.

Towards a Permanent International Court

Most significantly, the creation of the Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals has given new impetus to the endeavor to establish a permanent international criminal court. Driving this endeavor is the belief that justice must never be applied to only certain cases in the so called "developed" or Western world. Justice must be applied fairly to all people, irrespective of their geographic location or of their "strategic value" to powerful states. For this reason, many human rights advocates believe that the creation of *ad hoc* tribunals can only be justified if they are followed by the establishment of a permanent International Criminal Court. Fortunately, there is now a strong possibility that an international convention for this purpose will be held in June, 1998.

There are a number of reasons why the establishment of such a court would truly represent a major victory in the international community's struggle against impunity. First, it would clearly reaffirm the international community's concern for the victims of massive, systematic, or organized violence, and demonstrate that its effort to condemn and prohibit such actions is sincere. In doing so, this initiative will hopefully help to restore the faith in humanity which many victims have lost.

Second, national governments are at times either unwilling or unable to see to it that crimes of international concern are effectively prosecuted. In such circumstances, it is necessary to have an impartial international institution which can ensure that justice is done.

Third, a permanent international criminal court will be able to provide a timely, effective and impartial response when necessary, and thereby ensure that the deterrent effect of international prohibitions is continuously maintained. Similarly, it has also been recognized that justice can never be selective and that justice delayed is often justice denied.


Fourth, establishing an institution which is able to individualize criminal responsibility, the international community will likely be more successful in its efforts to break the cycles of violence

and reprisals which underlie so many deep-rooted conflicts. Thus by absolving the majority of a group's members from the burden of collective responsibility, a permanent court will not only help to halt impunity, but will also serve to promote peace and reconciliation.

Finally, in the interest of securing greater respect for the international "rule of law" it is imperative that the international community work to address the imbalance in which crimes committed during inter-state conflict are more likely to be punished than crimes committed during communal conflict, (e.g. the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda). It is only by doing so that a lasting victory against impunity will be brought closer. This would be a fitting end to a century in which humanity's destructiveness seems to have surpassed its moral evolution.

Discussion Questions

1. What, in your opinion, should be done with the some 90,000 Rwandans in prison who are suspected of complicity in the genocide? How can the demands for justice and the need for reconciliation in Rwanda be met? How have other countries (South Africa, Guatemala, Cambodia) moved forward in the aftermath of injustice, civil war, and genocide?
2. By establishing a permanent International Criminal Court, it is hoped that impunity will be ended for those who commit grave crimes against humanity. What are the obstacles to establishing this permanent International Criminal Court? How can we as activists address these obstacles?
3. Too often, the international community turns its attention away from a country after a crisis has passed, focusing instead on other emerging crises. Discuss ways the international community plays a role in establishing a new rule of law and culture of human rights in the aftermath of genocide and civil war?



THE NUREMBERG PRINCIPLES

Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, as formulated by the International Law Commission, June-July, 1950.

Principle I

Any person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefor and liable to punishment.

Principle II

The fact that internal law does not impose a penalty for an act which constitutes a crime under international law does not relieve the person who committed the act from responsibility under international law.

Principle III

The fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a crime under international law acted as Head of State or responsible government official does not relieve him from responsibility under international law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him.

Principle IV

The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility under international law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him.

Principle V

Any person charged with a crime under international law has the right to a fair trial on the facts and law.

Principle VI

The crimes hereinafter set out are punishable as crimes under international law:

a. Crimes against peace:

1. Planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances;
2. Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the acts mentioned under 1.

b. War crimes; violations of the laws or customs of war which include, but are not limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave-labour, or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.

c. Crimes against humanity: murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhuman acts done against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds, when such acts are done or such persecutions are carried on in execution of or in connection with any crime against peace or any war crime.

Principle VII

Complicity in the commission of a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity as set forth in Principle VI is a crime under international law.



CLASSROOM ACTIVITIES

by Nancy Flowers and Janet Schmidt
Educators Network, Amnesty International USA

CONTENTS

- ♦ TO THE TEACHER
- ♦ SUGGESTED SCHEDULE OF ACTIVITIES
- ♦ ACTIVITY I: THE GEOGRAPHY OF RWANDA
- ♦ ACTIVITY II: DEFINING GENOCIDE
- ♦ ACTIVITY III: HISTORY OF THE GREAT LAKES REGION
- ♦ ACTIVITY IV: RE-ENACTMENT OF HORROR
- ♦ ACTIVITY V: DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
- ♦ ACTIVITY VI: HATE SPEECH/HATE CRIMES
- ♦ ACTIVITY VII: TAKING ACTION

♦ TO THE TEACHER

Due to the violent content and complex political background of *Forsaken Cries*, it is recommended only for students in the upper high school grades or college years.

Students need preparatory activities before viewing *Forsaken Cries* to give them both background information and some personal objectives and questions to ask as they watch the video. Scenes of brutality will naturally evoke horrified responses, but by offering context, raising questions of accountability, and providing opportunities to respond with discussion and action, teachers can use *Forsaken Cries* to create valuable lessons about history, geography, current events, and international relations, as well as human rights and individual and collective social responsibility.

When introducing the unit, the teacher needs to stress the seriousness of the subject and the fact that these events are not only real but also recent; their repercussions continue to have major impact on the international scene. Before viewing the film, students need some warning it contains extremely upsetting footage. Following the viewing, they may need to express their reactions to the film in pairs or small groups.

◆ SUGGESTED SCHEDULE OF ACTIVITIES

Day 1: Preparatory Activities (Activities I, II, and III).

Day 2: Activity IV.

Day 3: Viewing the video and discussion.

Day 4: Follow-up Activities (Activities V and VI)

Day 5: Action Activities (Activity VIII)

I. PREPARATORY ACTIVITIES

A. Activities I - III can be done in sequence by the full class, but ideally small groups will work simultaneously on different tasks, with each group summarizing what it has discovered for the rest of the class.

- Activity/Group I: The Geography of Rwanda
- Activity/Group II: Defining Genocide
- Activity/Group III: History of the Great Lakes Region

B. Activity IV: "Re-Enacting the Horror" is a group role play that helps students grasp the complexity of the players and motivations, both internal and international, that contributed to the Rwanda genocide. Students need to be reminded often of the purpose of the activity and the seriousness of the real events that they are re-enacting. In debriefing the activity, students will often be unable to explain the motivation of their roles. Ideally the re-enactment will leave the class with unresolved questions and confusions that the video may address.

II. VIEWING THE VIDEO

A. Before showing the video, remind each group of their viewing assignments. Encourage them to take notes as they watch. Warn them that the video they are about to see contains graphic scenes of real-life brutality, which they may find upsetting; explain also that the purpose for watching such violence is to try to understand how such events happen and how they can be prevented.

B. After viewing, allow some time for students to express themselves about what they have seen, perhaps in pairs or small groups.

III. FOLLOW-UP ACTIVITIES

A. Ask students to report on their viewing assignments and discuss their observations. Then allow time to grapple with some of their questions in Activity V, "Discussion Questions."

B. Activity VI, "The Power of Hate Speech" attempts to make a connection between the video and students' personal experiences.

C. Students' sense of helplessness in the face of such enormities can be somewhat alleviated by offering opportunities for personal action. Such actions are much more meaningful, however, when students can choose their own response. It is much more effective to offer a variety of issues and actions for students to choose among, such as those suggested in Activity VII, "Taking Action."

◆ ACTIVITY I: THE GEOGRAPHY OF RWANDA

Goal: To introduce students to the geography of Rwanda and stimulate them to theorize about the relation of geographic features to the social, economic and political life of the country.

Time: 1 class period

Materials: Map of Great Lakes of Africa Region from essay entitled "History of Rwanda," in *Educating for Action*
World atlas and U.S. atlas
Rwanda geography fact sheet

Procedure:

1. Locate Rwanda on a map of Africa. Describe its location in a few sentences.
2. Using an atlas and the map of the Great Lakes region, answer these questions about the location of the country:
 - ◆ What are the countries in the Great Lakes region? What are their capitals?
 - ◆ What countries share a border with Rwanda?
 - ◆ What is the approximate size of Rwanda? What U.S. state is of approximately the same size? How does Rwanda compare to the size of its neighbors?
 - ◆ How does the African Great Lakes Region compare in size and geography with the North American Great Lakes?
3. Using an atlas, answer these questions about the geography of Rwanda:
 - ◆ What are the principal landscape features (e.g., rivers, mountains, lakes, seacoasts, etc.)?
 - ◆ Are there many paved roads in Rwanda?
 - ◆ What is the climate like? What is the average temperature? Rainfall?
 - ◆ What are the main crops?
 - ◆ Based on landscape features, what do you think are the main means and routes of transportation in Rwanda?
 - ◆ How do you think these features affect life in Rwanda?
4. What is the total population of Rwanda? What is population density? What U.S. state has a similar sized population?
5. What languages are spoken in Rwanda? What is the official language?
6. What are Rwanda's principal exports? What is the main source of income in Rwanda? Considering its location, what are the best ways for exports and imports to leave and enter Rwanda?
7. Summary: Summarize the ways in which Rwanda's geography might affect the political and social life of its government and people.

Viewing Assignment:

- ◆ As you watch the video, take note of aspects of the geography that might affect the events in Rwanda, especially the movement of refugees into and out of Rwanda.

Rwanda Geography Fact Sheet

Rwanda consists mainly of grassy uplands and hills that extend southeast from a chain of volcanoes in the northwest. It is divided by the Congo and Nile drainage systems and has many lakes. Lake Kivu and the Ruzizi River Valley, which form the western boundary with Zaire, constitute part of the western portion of the Great Rift Valley.

Area:	10, 169 square miles
Population:	6.8 million (1988)
Population density:	128 per square mile, the highest in sub-Saharan Africa
Languages:	French, Kinyarwanda
Ethnic groups:	Hutu 85%, Tutsi 14%, Twa 1%
Capital:	Kigali (est. pop. 300,000)
Other cities:	Gitarama, Butare, Ruhengeri, Gesenyi
Terrain:	Grassy uplands and hills
Climate:	Mild and temperate, with two rainy seasons
Natural resources:	cassiterite, wolfram
Agricultural Products:	coffee, tea, pyrethrum, cinchona
Industry Types:	Imports: petroleum, products, consumer goods beer production, soft drinks, soap, furniture, shoes, plastic goods, textiles, cigarettes
Trade (1987):	Exports—coffee, tea, hides and skins, pyrethrum Imports—petroleum products, consumer goods

Source: Countries of the World and Their Leaders Yearbook 1997, Volume 2,
(Detroit: Gale Research, 1997).

♦ ACTIVITY II: DEFINING GENOCIDE

Goal: To introduce students to the concept and definition of genocide as defined in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

Time: 1 class period

Materials: Handouts: Essay entitled "What is Genocide?" and "The Genocide Convention" in *Educating for Action*

Definitions: Convention - An agreement among governments on certain attitudes or practices. When a government signs an international Convention, it has the status of a treaty, a formal legal undertaking by which that government agrees to abide.
Contracting Party - Governments who have signed an agreement such as a Convention.
Ratification - Formal approval of a legal document, usually by a vote of the legislature of a government.
Reservations - Parts of an agreement that a government wishes to exclude when it ratifies a Convention, indicating it agrees with all parts except those named in its reservations.

Procedure:

1. As a group, try to make up a definition of genocide that everyone can agree with. Write it on a piece of chart paper. Under the group definition write any other definitions that not everyone could agree on.
2. Read the handout "What is Genocide?" As you read, mark passages that indicate how genocide is defined in international law.
3. How does your group definition compare to the definition in international law?
 - ♦ Which definition is broader?
 - ♦ Why do you think there was so much debate about the definition of genocide used in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the crime of Genocide?
 - ♦ Can you think of examples from history that fit the definition of genocide used in international law?
4. Read Article II of the Genocide Convention. Can you think of any events in history that fit these definitions (e.g., a case where measures were taken to prevent births within a certain oppressed group)?
5. What reservation did the U.S. government make when it ratified the Genocide Convention in 1988? Why do you think the U.S. made this reservation?
6. Why do you think that nations might be reluctant to declare atrocities to be acts of genocide, even when they fit the definition set out in the convention?
7. Summary: Using the handout, write out the definition of genocide used in international law. Below it write the U.S. reservation.

Viewing Assignments:

- ◆ On what grounds do the events in Rwanda qualify as genocide according to the Genocide Convention?
- ◆ How does your understanding of the definition of genocide and the U.S. reservations about the Genocide Convention help you to explain the U.S. and the reluctance of other countries to call events in Rwanda genocide?
- ◆ According to your understanding of the Genocide Convention, what kinds of response should the international community have made to events in Rwanda when they occurred? After they occurred?

♦ ACTIVITY III: HISTORY OF RWANDA

Goal: To familiarize students with the historical background of the Rwandan genocide.

Time: 1 class period

Materials: Handout: Essay entitled "History of Rwanda" from *Educating for Action*
Chart paper or overhead transparency and pens to make a historical timeline.

Procedure:

1. Read "The History of Rwanda" aloud as a group, stopping at the end of each section to summarize what information should go on the timeline: central events, key words, names of significant individuals, important facts. Alternatively, groups may wish to assign each section to a different person to read and summarize for the whole group.
2. Prepare the time line on chart paper or an overhead transparency so that the rest of the class can see it clearly.
3. Summary: Later the whole class will participate in a re-enactment of these events. Be prepared to present and explain this time line to the rest of the class and to help others understand their roles in the re-enactment.

Viewing Assignments:

- ♦ How did events, policies, and decisions in the colonial period play a role in the Rwandan genocide?
- ♦ What ideas about race seem to have influenced Belgium's choice of the Tutsi as their allies? Have you ever heard similar theories of racial superiority?
- ♦ Many feel the international community could and should have intervened in Rwanda to prevent the genocide. As you watch the video, note particular points where events could have been stopped.
- ♦ The term "political will" is used frequently towards the end of the video. What do you think it means? How would it relate to the action of the international community towards Rwanda?

◆ ACTIVITY IV: RE-ENACTMENT OF HORROR

Goal: To clarify the social history of Rwanda and the roles played by the international community and internal factions in creating the 1994 genocide.

Time: Approximately 1 class period (fifty minutes to 1 hour)

Materials: Role cards
Name signs to wear (These may be prepared by the group responsible for Activity III: "History of Rwanda.")

Preparation: Draw a circle on the floor in chalk to represent Rwanda.
Draw adjacent circles to represent Uganda, Zaire, and Burundi. (This may be done by the group responsible for Activity I, "The Geography of Rwanda".)

Procedure:

The facilitator or a participant reads the scenario. The participants use the information on their role cards and act accordingly. The activity concludes with a discussion of the roles.

Setting the Stage

1. The facilitator explains the purpose of the activity, stressing that the roles they are about to play represent real-life events in which millions of people suffered and continue to suffer. Furthermore, the consequences of these events continue today to affect world peace, stability, and fates of millions of people. The purpose of the activity is not to amuse but to clarify very complicated relations among peoples, organizations, and states by simplifying them to representative roles. The facilitator cannot stress too strongly the seriousness of the events enacted in the activity. Each Tutsi and Hutu role represents up to a million human lives.
2. The facilitator and/or the group responsible for Activity I, "The Geography of Rwanda" explains that the circles represent Rwanda and neighboring countries.
3. The facilitator and/or the group responsible for Activity III: "The History of Rwanda" distributes International Community role cards (Cards 1-5) by some arbitrary method (birthdays, alphabetical order, etc.). These roles are then explained to the whole group and questions answered. Participants write their names on a paper, which they then attach to their front:
 - Belgium (Card #1)
 - France (Card #2)
 - the USA (Card #3)
 - the UN (Card #4)
 - Non-governmental Organizations (NGO's), including missionaries groups, refugee workers, relief agencies. (Card #5)

The rest of the participants will first be designated as "Rwandans" and receive their roles in Scene 1.

4. The facilitator (or a participant) reads each scenario and the players in that scene will respond according to the information on their role cards.

Scene 1: COLONIAL PERIOD, 1890-1959

Players: "Belgium" and all the "Rwandans"

1. "Belgium" explains its interest and what it needs as a colonial power.
2. "Belgium" then passes out identity cards (i.e., role cards) at random to all the "Rwandans," who write their names and attach them to their fronts.
 - a. 15% (3 in a group of 20) will get cards that state that they are Tutsi. (Cards 6-8). One Tutsi will be designated as "RPF" (Card 6).
 - b. 85% (17 in a group of 20) will state that they are Hutu. (Cards 9+)
Among those with Hutu cards, 20% (3 in a group of 17) will get cards that designate them as Hutu extremists. (Cards 11-13) One extremist will be designated as "Radio Mille Collines." (Card 13).
One Hutu will be designated "Gregory Kayabanda" (Card 9).
One Hutu will be designated "Gen. Juvenal Habyarimana" (Card 10).
Five Hutu will be designated as "moderates" (Cards 14-18).
Other Hutu will have no particular political position (Cards 19+).
3. "Belgium" then takes the Tutsis to one side and explains the privileges they will have. The Tutsis then tell the Hutus their new privileges. They react with pleasure.
4. The Tutsis then announce to the Hutus their new lower status. They react with strong displeasure.

Scene 2: TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENCE, 1959-1962

Players: "NGO's," "Belgium," "Hutus," and "Tutsis"

1. "NGO," representing missionaries pleads with "Belgium" to reverse the inequities of previous policies that favored Tutsis before the country becomes independent.
2. "Belgium" agrees and announces these changes to the "Rwandans," who react strongly, Hutus cheering and Tutsis complaining.
3. "NGO's" and "Belgium" say good-bye and leave the circle.

Scene 3: INDEPENDENT RWANDA, 1962

Players: "Hutus" and "Tutsis"

1. The player who is "Gregory Kayabanda" (Card 9) identifies him/herself as the first president of Rwanda and announces his pro-Hutu policies. All the Hutus applaud.
2. One of the "Tutsis" (Card 8) announces that he/she is going to flee for safety against this "ethnic cleansing" and leaves the circle for Uganda. The other Tutsis express fear and anxiety.

Scene 4: THE HABYARIMANA GOVERNMENT, 1972-1994

Players: "Hutus," "Tutsis," and "France"

1. The player who has the card "General Juvenal Habyarimana" (Card 10) announces his overthrow of the government and new policies. ("Gregory Kayabanda" takes off name sign and takes the role of an ordinary Hutu).
2. The Tutsi who fled Rwanda in Step 4 now identifies him/herself as the "Rwandan Patriotic Front" (RPF) tries to persuade "Habyarimana" to let him/her return home. He rejects this appeal.

3. Now "RPF" approaches and tries to enter the circle by force. "France" and the "Hutu Extremists" try to stop this, and when "RPF" enters the circle, they push "RPF" into a corner of the Rwanda circle, where "RPF" continues to make aggressive sounds and gestures.

Scene 5: ESCALATION TOWARD GENOCIDE, JANUARY-APRIL, 1994

Players: "Hutus" and "Tutsis," "France," "NGO's," "Belgium," "USA," and "UN"

1. "General Juvenal Habyarimana" announces plans for compromise with the "RPF." "Hutu Extremists" show great displeasure and argue against this because they want to maintain power.
2. "France," "NGO's," "Belgium," and "UN" enter and along with "RPF" try to persuade "Habyarimana" to keep these peace agreements. They take one of "Habyarimana's" arms and pull him in one direction. "Hutu Extremists" grab the other arm and pull him in the other direction.
3. "Habyarimana" responds by telling the "Hutu Extremists" that they are no longer members of the government. They go off together to one corner where they shout out anti-Tutsi comments. "Radio Mille Collines" calls for the murder of Tutsis and condemn moderate Hutus of betraying their cause. They try to push around other Hutus and Tutsis who come into reach. "France" stands nearby with arms folded.
4. "NGO's" leaves the circle and tries to get the attention of "UN" and "USA" about what is going on, but they refuse to listen.
5. A Hutu moderate tries to tell the UN that a genocide is being planned, but UN refuses to listen.

Scene 6: THE GENOCIDE UNLEASHED, APRIL, 1994

Players: "Hutus" and "Tutsis," "France," "NGO's," "Belgium," and "UN"

1. "Habyarimana" announces that he is going to Tanzania to finalize peace agreements and leaves the circle of Rwanda.
2. Extremists declare they are going to prevent this peace and start planning the attack on Tutsis, moderate Hutus, and human rights workers. They forcibly pull in 4 or 5 Hutu Moderates to join their actions. They give out weapons. "France" helps them train their "army." "Radio Colline" calls for the death of all Tutsis and accuses Hutus who do not join in the killing as betrayers of the Hutu people.
3. As "Habyarimana" tries to reenter the country, the "Hutu Extremists" shoot him, and he lies dead.
4. As soon as "Habyarimana" lies down, "Hutu Extremists" start trying to kill the Tutsis (one lies down as dead, the other escapes outside the circle) and the moderate Hutus (one tries to reason with the extremists and then lies down as dead, two escape outside the circle, the rest act frighten and try to join the "Hutu Extremists" or get far away from them).
5. "UN" and "Belgium" declare that these are "bloodthirsty Africans" and leave the country. Outside the circle, "USA" declares "acts of genocide are occurring" but that this is not genocide. Inside the circle "France" declares that it is defending Rwanda against invaders. NGO's beg for help from those outside the circle but all fold their arms and turn their backs.

Scene 7: THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS UNFOLDS, JUNE, 1994

1. "RPF" begins to fight back successfully, moving out of the corner into the middle of Rwanda.
2. "France" begins to try to stop the fighting and protects "Hutus Extremists" and 3 "Moderate Hutus" trying to cross the border to Zaire.
3. "Hutu Extremists" and "Moderate Hutu" supporters escape across the border into Zaire. Two other Rwandans "without political positions" also cross into Zaire.
4. "NGO's" rush to Zaire and calls out to the others in the International Community for help to care for all these refugees. UN and USA hurry over to help, miming giving out food to Hutus in Zaire, who line up.

5. "Hutu Extremists" take off their name tags and push in the front of the food line. Then they take control, giving out food and orders to all the other Rwandans outside the country.

Debriefing the Role Play

1. The facilitator calls an end of the scenario by asking everyone to sit down where they are.
2. The facilitator reminds the participants again of the purpose of this re-enactment and that this activity was not a fiction but a genocide in which millions of people suffered. The facilitator then reads to the group from "The History of Rwanda," (p. 5, starting with the fourth paragraph, "The only impediments to the massacres lay in the consciences of some individuals..." to the end of the section).
3. The facilitator, acting in the role of a reporter, then asks these questions of the key players (International Community) :
 - a. What was your "stake" in Rwanda, i.e. what did you want to achieve in this country and its unfolding crisis?
 - b. Why do you think you acted as you did here? Many students will lack sufficient information to explain their roles (e.g., why was France involved at all?). Others may have only superficial guesses.
4. The facilitator then asks the whole group what they think should happen next? How can Rwanda hope to achieve peace and stability after what has happened?

• ROLE CARDS FOR "RE-ENACTING THE HORROR"

CARD 1: Belgium

Scene 1: You need natives to work with you in order to rule your colonial empire. In Rwanda you choose the Tutsis as your collaborators, in part because they are taller and thinner than the Hutus with sharp noses - qualities you consider "racially superior." You give them positions of power, access to higher education, and control over land, the most important resource in this agricultural country. You pass out racial identity cards.

Scene 2: NGO pleads with you to change the unfair rules against Hutus before independence. You announce that their roles will be reversed. Then you say goodbye and leave the circle with NGO.

Scene 6: You enter Rwanda at the beginning and observe the activity. You then respond with disgust, saying these are "bloodthirsty Africans." You then leave the circle and turn your back when NGO asks for help.

Scene 7: When NGO calls for help with the refugees, you rush in and start distributing food.

CARD 2: France

Scene 4: You enter the circle and start training the extremist Hutus in military drills. When RPF tries to enter the circle you and the extremists try to prevent this. When RPF gets into the circle, you and the extremists push RPF into one corner.

Scene 5: You stand near the extremists with your arms folded, watching all their actions.

Scene 6: You help the Hutu extremists train their army. At the end of the scene, following reactions from UN, Belgium, and USA, you declare that you are only helping Rwanda defend itself against invaders.

Scene 7: You try to stop the fighting between RPF and the extremists; as the RPF gets stronger, you help the extremists and their supporters escape to Zaire.

CARD 3: the USA

Scene 5: NGO pleads for your and UN's attention about Rwanda. You fold your arms and turn your back.

Scene 6: You observe the activity from outside the circle. You then declare that "acts of genocide are occurring" but not genocide. You take no action and turn your back when NGO asks for help.

Scene 7: When NGO calls for help with the refugees, you rush in and start distributing food.

CARD 4: the UN

Scene 5: You join with Belgium, and NGO's in trying to persuade Habyarimana to keep the peace agreements he has made with the RPF. With them you grab one of his arms and pull in one direction. You then step outside the circle, where NGO pleads for your and USA's attention about Rwanda. You fold your arms and turn your back. A Hutu moderate also tries to tell you that a genocide is being planned. Again you turn your back.

Scene 6: You enter Rwanda at the beginning and observe the activity. You then respond with disgust, saying these are "bloodthirsty Africans." You then leave the circle and turn your back when NGO asks for help.

Scene 7: When NGO calls for help with the refugees, you rush in and start distributing food.

CARD 5: Non-governmental Organizations (NGO's), including missionaries groups, refugee workers, relief agencies.

Scene 2: You identify yourself as missionary workers and plead with Belgium to change the rules that discriminate against Hutus in favor of Tutsis before the country becomes independent. After Belgium agrees, you say goodbye to the Rwandans and leave the circle with Belgium.

Scene 5: You then step outside the circle and try to get UN's and USA's attention to the problems in Rwanda, but they fold their arms and turn their backs on you. You go back to the Rwanda circle.

Scene 6: You beg for help from those outside the circle, but all turn their backs.

Scene 7: You rush to Zaire and call the other members of the International Community to help you care for the refugees.

CARD 6: Rwandan/ Tutsi.

Scene 1: You tell the Hutus that they will no longer hold positions of power, be able to get higher educations or own land. Also they will have to pay increased taxes and do unpaid labor for the government.

Scene 6: You will be killed in the massacre. Lie down when Hutus attack you.

CARD 7: Rwandan/ Tutsi

Scene 1: You tell the Hutus that they will no longer hold positions of power, be able to get high educations or own land. Also they will have to pay increased taxes and do unpaid labor for the government.

Scene 6: When attacked, you flee Rwanda to Uganda.

CARD 8: Rwandan/ Tutsi

Scene 1: You tell the Hutus that they will no longer hold positions of power, be able to get higher educations or own land. Also they will have to pay increased taxes and do unpaid labor for the government.

Scene 3: You announce that you're afraid to remain in Rwanda under Kayabanda's "ethnic cleansing" policies and flee to Uganda.

Scene 4: You now announce that you have become the "Rwanda Patriotic-Front" (RPF) and standing outside the circle, try to persuade General Juvenal Habyarimana to let you return home. When he refuses, you try to enter the circle by force. France and the Hutu extremists try to stop you. You get inside the circle but they force you into a corner of the circle. From there you continue to make aggressive sounds and gestures.

Scene 5: Along with France, NGO's, Belgium, and UN, you try to persuade General Juvenal Habyarimana to keep the peace agreements, taking one of his arms and pulling him in one direction. You then go back to your corner.

Scene 7: You move out of the corner and start fighting the Hutu extremists and their allies, driving the extremists out of Rwanda.

CARD 9: Rwandan / Hutu - Gregory Kayabanda

Scene 3: You identify yourself as Gregory Kayabanda, first President of Rwanda after independence in 1962. You announce that your goal is to complete the removal of Tutsis from positions of power and replace them with Hutus, especially those from your southern clan. You prevent Tutsis from opportunities for higher education, military, or government positions. As a result, Tutsis confine their activities to business and agriculture.

Scene 4: You remove your Gregory Kayabanda sign and take the role of an ordinary, non-political Hutu.

CARD 10: Rwandan /Hutu - General Juvenal Habyarimana

Scene 4: You identify yourself as General Juvenal Habyarimana. You lead a military coup in 1973 and overthrow the regime of southern Hutus led by Gregory Kayabanda. You and your allies will hold power for the next 20 years. At first you permit Tutsis to engage in business, especially when it profits your new Hutu elite. Later, during an economic depression in 1990, refugee Tutsis in Uganda ask to make a peaceful return to Rwanda; you refuse, stating "There's not enough room for you in Rwanda."

Scene 5: You announce that you are going to compromise and make peace with the RPF. Hutu extremists shout at you angrily. NGO, Belgium, and UN try to persuade you to keep the peace agreements; they grab you by one arm and pull you in one direction. Hutu extremists grab you by the other arm and pull in the opposite direction. You break free, say you'll keep the peace agreements and angrily tell the Hutu extremists that they are no longer in your government.

CARD 11: Rwandan/ Hutu - You are a political extremist. You represent "Radio Mille Collines."

Scene 4: France leads you in military drills. When RPF tries to enter the circle you and France try to prevent this. When RPF gets into the circle, you push RPF into one corner.

Scene 5: When the other group grabs Habyarimana on one hand, you and the other extremists grab the other and pull him in the opposite direction, crying "No peace agreements." When he reacts by throwing you out of the government, you extremists go to one corner of the circle and shout out anti-Tutsi slogans. Try to grab any moderate Hutus and all Tutsis that come within reach.

Scene 6: When Habyarimana leaves the circle you start planning to attack Tutsis, moderate Hutus and NGO. You pull 4 or 5 moderate Hutus into your group, give them weapons, and get them to join you in shouting slogans. As Radio Mille Collines, you call for the death of all Tutsis and accuses Hutus who do not join in the killing as betrayers of the Hutu people. When Habyarimana tries to re-enter Rwanda, you shoot him down. Then you immediately attack the 2 Tutsis (one lies down) and 5 Hutu Moderates (the one who tries to reason with you lies down).

Scene 7: France helps you escape across the border into Zaire. There you take off your name tag and try to get in front of the food line, telling the other refugees what to do.

CARD 12: Rwandan/ Hutu - You are a political extremist.

Scene 5: France leads you in military drills. When RPF tries to enter the circle, you and France try to prevent this. When RPF gets into the circle, you push RPF into one corner.

Scene 6: When the other group grabs Habyarimana on one hand, you and the other extremists grab the other and pull him in the opposite direction, crying "No peace agreements." When he reacts by throwing you out of the government, you extremists go to one corner of the circle and shout out anti-Tutsi slogans. Try to grab any moderate Hutus and all Tutsis that come within reach.

Scene 6: When Habyarimana leaves the circle you start planning to attack Tutsis, moderate Hutus and NGO. You pull 4 or 5 moderate Hutus into your group, give them weapons, and get them to join you in shouting slogans.

Scene 7: France helps you escape across the border into Zaire. There you take off your name tag and try to get in front of the food line, telling the other refugees what to do.

CARD 13: Rwandan /Hutu -You are a political extremist.

Scene 5: France leads you in military drills. When RPF tries to enter the circle you and France try to prevent this. When RPF gets into the circle, you push RPF into one corner.

Scene 6: When the other group grabs Habyarimana on one hand, you and the other extremists grab the other and pull him in the opposite direction, crying "No peace agreements." When he reacts by throwing you out of the government, you extremists go to one corner of the circle and shout out anti-Tutsi slogans. Try to grab any moderate Hutus and all Tutsis that come within reach.

Scene 7: France helps you escape across the border into Zaire. There you take off your name tag and try to get in front of the food line, telling the other refugees what to do.

CARD 14: Rwandan /Hutu - You are a political moderate.

Scene 6: Hutu extremists pull you into their group and give you weapons. You attack Tutsis and moderate Hutus.

Scene 7: France helps you escape across the border into Zaire, where you get into the food line set up by NGO.

CARD 15: Rwandan /Hutu - You are a political moderate.

Scene 6: Hutu extremists pull you into their group and give you weapons. You attack Tutsis and moderate Hutus.

Scene 7: France helps you escape across the border into Zaire, where you get into the food line set up by NGO.

CARD 16: Rwandan /Hutu - You are a political moderate.

Scene 6: Hutu extremists pull you into their group and give you weapons. You attack Tutsis and moderate Hutus.

Scene 7: France helps you escape across the border into Zaire, where you get into the food line set up by NGO.

CARD 17: Rwandan /Hutu - You are a political moderate.

Scene 6: Hutu extremists pull you into their group and give you weapons. You attack Tutsis and moderate Hutus.

Scene 7: France helps you escape across the border into Zaire, where you get into the food line set up by NGO.

CARD 18: Rwandan /Hutu - You are a political moderate.

Scene 5: You leave the circle and try to tell UN that a genocide is about to happen. UN refuse to listen.

Scene 6: You try to reason with the extremists start attacking Tutsis and moderate Hutus. You lie down to indicate that they have killed you.

CARD 19: Rwandan /Hutu - You have no political position.

Scene 6: When the fighting starts, you escape to Zaire.

CARD 20: Rwandan /Hutu - You have no political position.

Scene 6: When the fighting starts, you escape to Zaire.

CARD 21: Rwandan /Hutu - You have no political position.

Scene 6: When the fighting starts, you remain in Rwanda.

CARD 22: Rwandan /Hutu - You have no political position.

Scene 6: When the fighting starts, you remain in Rwanda.

CARD 23: Rwandan /Hutu - You have no political position.

Scene 6: When the fighting starts, you remain in Rwanda.

CARD 24: Rwandan /Hutu - You have no political position.

Scene 6: When the fighting starts, you remain in Rwanda.

CARD 25: Rwandan /Hutu - You have no political position.

Scene 6: When the fighting starts, you remain in Rwanda.

ROLE CARDS FOR "RE-ENACTING THE HORROR"

CARD 1: Belgium

Scene 1: You need natives to work with you in order to rule your colonial empire. In Rwanda you choose the Tutsis as your collaborators, in part because they are taller and thinner than the Hutus with sharp noses - qualities you consider "racially superior." You give them positions of power, access to higher education, and control over land, the most important resource in this agricultural country. You pass out racial identity cards.

Scene 2: NGO pleads with you to change the unfair rules against Hutus before independence. You announce that their roles will be reversed. Then you say goodbye and leave the circle with NGO.

Scene 6: You enter Rwanda at the beginning and observe the activity. You then respond with disgust, saying these are "bloodthirsty Africans." You then leave the circle and turn your back when NGO asks for help.

Scene 7: When NGO calls for help with the refugees, you rush in and start distributing food.

CARD 2: France

Scene 4: You enter the circle and start training the extremist Hutus in military drills. When RPF tries to enter the circle you and the extremists try to prevent this. When RPF gets into the circle, you and the extremists push RPF into one corner.

Scene 5: You stand near the extremists with your arms folded, watching all their actions.

Scene 6: You help the Hutu extremists train their army. At the end of the scene, following reactions from UN, Belgium, and USA, you declare that you are only helping Rwanda defend itself against invaders.

Scene 7: You try to stop the fighting between RPF and the extremists; as the RPF gets stronger, you help the extremists and their supporters escape to Zaire.

CARD 3: the USA

Scene 5: NGO pleads for your and UN's attention about Rwanda. You fold your arms and turn your back.

Scene 6: You observe the activity from outside the circle. You then declare that "acts of genocide are occurring" but not genocide. You take no action and turn your back when NGO asks for help.

Scene 7: When NGO calls for help with the refugees, you rush in and start distributing food.

CARD 4: the UN

Scene 5: You join with Belgium, and NGO's in trying to persuade Habyarimana to keep the peace agreements he has made with the RPF. With them you grab one of his arms and pull in one direction. You then step outside the circle, where NGO pleads for your and USA's attention about Rwanda. You fold your arms and turn your back. A Hutu moderate also tries to tell you that a genocide is being planned. Again you turn your back.

Scene 6: You enter Rwanda at the beginning and observe the activity. You then respond with disgust, saying these are "bloodthirsty Africans." You then leave the circle and turn your back when NGO asks for help.

Scene 7: When NGO calls for help with the refugees, you rush in and start distributing food.

♦ ACTIVITY V: DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

Goal: To deepen understanding of the video and the events it presents

Time: Variable

Definitions: Impunity - Exemption from punishment, penalty, or harm.

Procedure: Divide the class into small groups to answer the following questions, or elicit responses from the class as a large group.

1. What people or groups do you think are responsible for the genocide in Rwanda? Is responsibility easy to determine? Why or why not?
2. Should anyone be punished for what happened in Rwanda? Who? How should they be punished? What persons or organizations should determine who is guilty? Should they be tried? If so, by whom? What should their punishment be?
3. What responsibility should governments have for their role in events like the Rwanda genocide? How can governments be punished or put on trial?
4. What would be the result if no one were punished for the Rwandan genocide? What is the effect of impunity for such crimes?
5. Do you know of any historical examples where people or groups were made accountable for their roles in oppressing others? Do you know of any historical examples where the perpetrators of crimes were not punished?
6. Why do you think this film was made? What result does it try to achieve? Do you think it achieved this goal?
7. Does the film seem to have a balanced, objective point of view? What result does it try to achieve? Do you think it achieved this goal?
8. How would you feel about this film if you were Belgian? French? The United Nations? A Tutsi? A Hutu extremist? A moderate Hutu? How might the film have been different if it had been made by the United Nations? A Tutsi? A Hutu extremist? A moderate Hutu?
9. The film was made by Amnesty International, a non-governmental organization. What do you know about this organization? If you are not familiar with it, what can you conclude about Amnesty International on the basis of this film?

♦ ACTIVITY VI: HATE SPEECH/HATE CRIMES

Goal: To relate events in *Forsaken Cries* to students' own experiences.

Time: 1 class period

Materials: Blackboard or chart paper, "Post-it's" or file cards

Definitions: Hate Crime - An act or an attempted act by any person against the person or property of another individual or group which in any way constitutes an expression of hostility toward the victim because of his or her race, religion, disability, gender, ethnicity, or sexual orientation.

Hate Speech - Spoken or written language that may lead to or incite hate crimes.

Procedure:

1. Introduce the topic of hate speech and hate crimes by writing the terms on the board and asking students to define them and give examples, first from the video, and then from their own observations.
2. Explain that the first part of this activity will focus on hate speech. Ask students, working together either in pairs or in small groups, to think of names they hear people being called in their school or neighborhood and write down the most hateful, each word on a separate card. Then all the cards should be posted on the board or chart paper.
3. Ask students to fit these words into categories (e.g., physical appearance, disability, race, religion, ethnicity, immigrant status, sexual orientation). Are any of these terms only for girls? For boys? What conclusions can be drawn about abusive language from these categories?
4. Draw a horizontal line on the board and label it "Playful/Mildly Abusive" at one end, "Somewhat Abusive" in the middle, and "Extremely Abusive/Hurtful" at the other end. Then choose one name from each category and ask each group to make a card for this word and place it along this scale of abuse. Almost certainly groups will disagree about the degree of severity. After three or four attempts, ask students what conclusion they can draw from their difficulty in agreeing on whether a term is abusive (i.e., that individuals experience words differently).
5. Discuss whether people should be able to use these words in class. Should they be able to use these words at school? On the street? In the media? Encourage students to define what limits they would place on abusive language and list these on the board.
6. Remind students of the definition of genocide in Activity II. Next ask, "Do you think hate speech can lead to hate crimes? To genocide? What was the role of hate speech in Rwanda?" Encourage students to give examples from their own experience as well.
7. Ask, "Doesn't the U.S. Constitution grant us freedom of expression? Shouldn't you have the right to say what you think of someone, even if it's negative?" You may want to structure this discussion as a debate.
8. Finally ask, "Does a teacher have a responsibility to stop hate speech in the classroom? Does the school have a responsibility to stop it on campus? Do you have a responsibility to stop it in your own life? If so, why? How should this be done? What can you do in your own community to stop hate speech? Why is it important to do so?"

♦ ACTIVITY VII: TAKING ACTION

Goal: To provide students with opportunities for meaningful action immediately following a series of classroom activities about Rwanda.

Time: 1 class period or more

Materials: Background information on the War Crimes Tribunal (see essay "Justice for the Victims?" and "Fight Genocide-Stop Impunity!" found in *Educating for Action*), addresses for Congressional Representatives, Secretary of State, Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal, and local newspapers

Procedure:

Note: It is important that students have the opportunity to choose between the following local, national, and international action opportunities. Some students may choose to continue with other actions outside of class, or you may choose to devote more class time for the action component.

1. Local Action against Hate Speech: Follow up on the discussion at the end of Activity VI: Hate Speech/Hate Crimes by writing a letter to your school or community newspaper. Express your opinion about hate speech and encourage further debate and discussion around the issue. If hate speech is a problem in your school, consider working with school organizations or the student council to foster a "Stop Hate Speech" campaign to draw attention to the dangers of hate speech both to individuals and the whole community, including its potential to lead to violence.
2. National and International Letter Writing Actions: Show the Clinton Administration, Congress, and the Tribunal that you care about justice in Central Africa and the work of the Tribunal! Write to your Congressional Representative and U.S. Secretary of State, Madeline K. Albright, about the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Urge the U.S. government to provide the necessary funding, managerial support and political backing, including strengthening and increasing the capacity of the Victim and Witness Unit, so that it can protect witnesses and survivors of the genocide, so that the tribunal can deliver justice and help break the cycle of impunity. Send a copy of your letter to Judge Louise Arbour, Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (addresses found in "Fight Genocide—Stop Impunity!" action sheet in *Educating for Action*).
3. Local Action Supporting the Tribunal: Write an article for your school newspaper or a letter to your community newspaper about the Tribunal, its importance to peace and stability in Central Africa and its importance to you and your community.
4. Educate your Community about Rwanda! Organize a presentation at your school, at an assembly, after school meeting, or in other classes. Investigate possibilities for a presentation in your community - a display or presentation at your public library, community center, church or synagogue. Show the video and organize discussions about it. Tell others what you have learned and continue to learn more yourself about the situation in Central Africa. You might collect newspaper clippings, watch and listen to news on TV and radio, and meet with others who are interested in staying informed about this subject.



RESOURCES

General Resources:

Africa Watch, *Rwanda: Talking Peace and Waging War: Human Rights Since the October 1990 Invasion*, London, February, 1992.

African Rights, *Rwanda: Death, Despair, Defiance*, London, 1994.

Berry, John A., and Carol Pott Berry, Eds and Trans. *Genocide in Rwanda: A Collective Memory*. 1995.

Des Forges, A., "Kings Without Crowns: The White Fathers" in D.F. McCall and N. Bennett, *Eastern Africa History*, New York: Praeger, 1969.

Gordon, N., *Murders in the Mist*, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1993.

Human Rights Watch/Africa, *Rwanda/Zaire: Rearming With Impunity: International Support for the Perpetrators of the Rwandan Genocide*, New York, May, 1995.

Kamukama, D., *Rwanda Conflict: Its Roots and Regional Implications*, Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1993.

Medecins Sans Frontieres, *Populations in Danger 1995*. London: Medecins Sans Frontieres, (UK), 1995.

Prunier, G., *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995.

Watson, C., *Exile from Rwanda: Background to an Invasion*, Washington, DC: U.S. Committee for Refugees, February, 1991.

Cultural Resources from the Great Lakes Region of Africa

AfricaNet Website: <http://www.ina.fr/CP/AeL/index.en.html>

Chansons Rwandaises, performed by Cecile Kayirebwa, Chaussee de Neerstalle 517, B-1180, Brussels, Belgium; Telephone 32 (2) 332-0560.

The Drummers of Burundi, 1992, A Womad Production for Realworld Music.

Kamaliza No. 1, performed by Mbe Mana Mbigirente.

Genocide—The International Laws:

Thornberry, *International Law and the Rights of Minorities*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991.

Rape as a Weapon:

Amnesty International, *It's About Time: Human Rights are Women's Right*, New York, 1995.

Refugee Rights

Amnesty International, *Rwanda and Burundi-The Return Home: Rumours and Realities*, New York, 1996.

Arms Flows:

- Africa, Disarmament and Security*. Proceedings of the Conference of African Research Institutes, 24-25 March, 1990. A United Nations publication, no. GV.E/F.91.0.1.
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- Human Rights Watch, *Arming Rwanda: The Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses in the Rwandan War*. Human Rights Watch Arms Project, Volume 6, Issue 1, January, 1994.
- Human Rights Watch, *Rearming with Impunity: International Support for the Perpetrators of the Rwandan Genocide*, Human Rights Watch Arms Project, Volume 7, Issue 4, May, 1995.

United Nations Resources:

- Home Page of the United Nations* <http://www.un.org/>
- Documents published by the United Nations* <http://www.un.org/Docs/>
- ReliefWeb*, the Web Site of the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, with daily updates of the situation in the Great Lakes Region: <http://www.reliefweb.int/>
- Security Council Resolutions* <http://www.un.org/Docs/Scres/>
- UNHCHR, Home Page of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights* <http://www.un.org/rights/>

